COPYHOLD CUTTING TRAIN CRASH

Copley, the labourer above alluded to, says, that he observed the engine at its usual speed. Hinge, the policeman on the viaduct, says he gave the signal "stead," because he observed the train was going rather faster than usual. Now the question is, What has been the usual speed on this part of the line. The average speed on the whole line for this train is 25 miles per hour, including the time lost at four intermediate stopping places, besides the stoppage at Horley to attach the assistant engine.

This will require an average speed of at least 28 miles per hour when travelling. Now for 
the first two miles  after leaving Horley the line ascends 1in 460 and then for four miles 
before reaching the Balcombe Tunnel it ascends 1 in 264, and thence descends for nearly 
six miles to the Hayward Station at the same rate, that is 1 in 264. 

From the notes and memoranda made by Sir Frederick Smith and myself in travelling 
together over some thousand miles of railway, and over every variety of gradient. I have no 
doubt that to preserve an average speed of 28 miles per hour though this12 miles would a 
speed of 32 miles per hour on the descending side.

Now it is admitted that the train was behind its proper time, a strong reason for not going 
slower than usual. Jackson denies having seen the signal “steady" on the viaduct, he seems 
therefore to have had no good motive for going slower. and he states that he has frequently 
passed this place at 35 miles per hour; and yet he asserts that just on this particular occasion, when such a Frightful accident occurred, he was not proceeding at more than 20 or 23 miles per hour. His statement on this head is certainly supported by the opinion of John Hardy. Eq.. M.P., who was a passenger, but it is greatly at variance with probability, and with other evidence.

It has been seen that the usual speed down this plane is about 32 miles per hour, and Hinge admitted in his evidence before the jury that he thought the speed was greater than, usual. It appears also that he made use of expressions soon after the accident, which would simply that the speed was much greater than he stated before the coroner.

Since I have been engaged on this inquiry, I have had communication with two of the 
gentlemen on the jury, who met me afterwards by appointment, and whose statement throws great doubt on this man’s evidence. I quote the following from their two letters.

“I beg to state that, although on the evidence brought before them the jury would come to no other conclusion than that at which they arrived, I felt, and still feel, by no means satisfied at the statement made by John Hinge, the policeman, on the highly important point of the speed with which the train was travelling at, or immediately before. the time of the accident. I was at the Copyhold bridge about two hours after the accident happened, when this police-man addressed m e and said, that when k first saw the train coming towards him he was sure something would happen from the speed at which it was going. He said he held up his hand to signal ‘ steady.' but that his heart was up in his mouth as they passed him; that he ran to a point in the mad where he could watch them farther, and in a very short time the accident occurred. He was heard to state this by other persons also, who have, I believe, informed you of the same thing The man, however, when called as a witness denied having made any such statement. Whether he had really forgotten what he previously said, or in the excitement and alarm occasioned by the accident had stated that which was not the fact, I am unable to say; but it is obvious, that the effects on the minds of the jury would have been very different if the original account of the policeman had been substantiated before them."
The other gentleman states as follows:-" Soon after the accident occurred I went to the 
spot, and accompanied one of the inspectors and a gentleman, who is a stranger to me, 
to the shed where the bodies of the unfortunate victims had been deposited. A policeman 
was in attendance, who volunteered the following remarks:-He said that he observed the 
train approaching him near the viaduct (where he was on duty) at such a rapid rate that 
he was much terrified; that he fully expected some accident to happened in consequence 
of the great speed with which they were proceeding, and was only surprised it did not 
occur sooner than it did; that he held up his hand as a signal to slacken speed, but that 
no notice was taken of it. Being one of the jury on the inquest held two days after, I 
insisted upon this man's evidence being heard. It was not until after much delay had taken place, and the coroner more than once called for him, that he made his appearance. On questioning him as to his former statement he totally denied having used such expressions as those which I had attributed to him, declared that he had not been the least frightened, nor had entertained any apprehension of fatal consequences arising from the speed, Which h he then said was not extreme; yet he allowed that he held up his hand as a caution, but could not be certain that the signal ad been seen by the driver.”

“As a juryman I did not think that I could also act as a witness; and not being aware at the 
time that the policeman had made similar statements to others, who could be called upon to 
give evidence of the fact, I thought I ought not to allow the policeman's previous assertions to influence the verdict, as they were not borne out by the evidence. But as it appears that 
Government has commissioned you to investigate the circumstances which attended the 
accident, I feel that, being no longer fettered by my position as a juryman, I should not be 
acting fairly towards the public if I withheld this statement from you.”

These gentlemen, who have no wish that their names should be unnecessarily brought 
before the public, are, notwithstanding, quite ready, if called upon, to substantiate what 
they have thus stated.

It is not, perhaps, my place to make any comments in this report on the conduct of the 
policeman; but it is impossible not to conclude from these statements, and other circumstances, that the speed down the plane was excessive, and inconsistent with the then state of the road; or, perhaps, with common prudence under any circumstances.

Of course the above statements impugn also Jackson's evidence; and I am sorry that the 
jury seam to have given too much weight, in my opinion, to his explanations as to the 
probable cause of the accident This man states that he has been a driver for four years and a half, three years in the service of the London and Brighton Company, before which he belonged to the London and Birmingham Company. He states that he never met with any accident himself from the four wheeled engines on the latter line; but had heard of a case of one of those engines getting off the line near Harrow.

Now surely this is very slight ground on which to come to a conclusion that such engines 
are unsafe, and for attributing to the use of them two accidents on two successive days 
within about a mile of each other.

It appears from a statement I have received from Mr. Bury, the maker of these engines, and who is also the superintendent of the locomotive department of the London and Birmingham Railway, that since the opening of that line, in July, 1837, they have used no other than four-wheeled engines; that they have travelled more than three million miles, which is nearly equivalent to making thirty thousand complete journeys between London and Birmingham; and that they have in no instance met with a single accident that can be said to have been occasioned be the particular construction of the engine.

There is, however, as stated by Jackson, some difference between the Birmingham and 
Brighton four-wheeled engines. They have both the same stroke and the same diameter of wheels; but the former has smaller cylinders, viz., some having twelve-inch cylinders, 
weighing, full of water, under 10 tons; others of thirteen-inch cylinders, weighing, under 
like circumstances, between 11 and 12 tons.

On the Brighton line the four-wheeled engines have all fourteen-inch cylinders, and weigh, when charged with water and fuel, between 13 and 14 tons. This increased size of cylinder requires increased dimensions; and, the wheels being of the same diameter, necessarily raises the centre of gravity, and thus far they may be said to be more top-heavy, and are, perhaps, more liable to rock; but the difference must be very  inconsiderable.

In order to form some comparison of the top-heaviness of the two engines employed on 
that particular day when the accident occurred, Mr. Rastrick obligingly permitted one of 
his assistants to make me two outlined elevations of them, that is, of a four-wheeled engine of precisely the same dimensions as that which was destroyed, and the other of the identical six-wheeled engine driven by Jackson. I forward with this report these two drawings, by which it will be seen, as nearly as it is possible to form an opinion, that there is little or no difference in the place of the centre of gravity in the two engines. The upper part of the boiler of the six-wheeled engine is the highest, but its water line is the lowest; as far, therefore, as relates to top heaviness on which much stress is laid by Jackson, I am of opinion there is little or no difference.

In making these remarks, I beg it may be distinctly understood that I am not advocating, 
Or giving a preference to, the four-wheeled engines. My object in referring to the subject 
is, that the jury, by giving too much weight to W  at I consider to be an erroneous opinion, have lost sight of the main causes of the accident, which I feel the strongest conviction were over driving and a road partially injured by the heavy rains that had recently fallen. I think, moreover, that the withdrawing of those engines from the line, in compliance with the recommendation  of the jury, has a tendency to give a false confidence to the Brighton passengers, while it is calculated to give unfounded alarm to those travelling on the London and Birmingham and some other lines.

It now only remains, my Lord, to inform our Lordship of the result of my examination into the circumstances attending the falling o the front of the Patcham tunnel This was, I believe, occasioned by the chalk being left at a considerable slope, which caused the "backing in," when impregnated with the excessive heavy rains, to slide along the face of the chalk, and thus by its pressure overcoming the resistance opposed to it. Mr. Rastrick also apprehends that a pipe. intended for a drain, had become by some means choaked, which increased ' the evil. A slight crack, it appears, had been observed early on the Thursday morning; but no danger was apprehended till immediately after the passage of the 10h. 45m. morning train.

In the fall of the front of the tunnel, a part of the brick work of the tunnel itself, for about 
six feet, was fractured. It remained shored up the second day, hut was removed during 
the following night. The remaining part is an extremely fine piece of brickwork, and is 
perfectly safe, only requiring for the present a constant watching, to remove any fragments of chalk that may fall upon the line from the present nearly vertical face of the cutting. Steps will be immediately taken to reface the tunnel; and it is, I believe, Mr. Rastrick's intention to lengthen the brickwork of it a little towards Brighton.

In the further compliance with your Lordship's instructions, after making this examination I proceeded along the line with the special engine and carriage, accompanied by Mr. Rastrick, to Hayward Heath, stopping and examining everything that appeared to require it. Mr. Rastrick here left me to return to Brighton, having first appropriated m me the coupe of the carriage, in which I proceeded to Croydon ; and if I might venture to give a practical opinion relative to the construction and present state of the line, I should say that the engine has done, and well done, everything that could be effected; but he has had to deal in some parts with very treacherous materials, and time will be required for them to take up a firm and solid state. 

In other parts, where the soil is better, the line is very perfect. The bridges, the viaducts, 
and four out of the five tunnels, are, in regard of interior brickwork, in perfect condition; 
but the Hayward Heath Tunnel is much oppressed with water from the late excessive 
rains; but great efforts are being made to carry the water off, and a few days of fine 
weather will enable much to be accomplished. Those parts of the line which have suffered most from the rains are two short pieces of the embankment south of the Redhill Station ; another considerable portion south of the Balcombe Tunnel, and just beyond 
the Hayward Heath Tunnel southward.

Sir Frederick Smith, in his general approval of this line, has drawn the attention of the 
engineer to certain portions of it, on which he conceived the safety of the public called 
for specific precautions a d reduced speed. These precautions have been rendered more 
particularly necessary in consequence of the recent heavy rains, which have also 
produced some other weak points; and I conceive that it is most desirable that at 
present, and during the approaching winter, more time should be allowed for the 
journey, in order that great caution may be observed in those parts where the line has 
most sufferer.

I have ascertained that both Jackson and Charles Goldsmith were discharged servants 
of the London and Birmingham Company, but Goldsmith had never been a driver.

Driver Jackson had previously been employed as an engine driver since the early part of 
1837, by the London & Birmingham company. After being discharged from this company in 
c1838, driver Jackson later found employment with the L.B.S.C.R. having been an engine 
driver for about a year and half.

LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Frederic Smith, 

covering Professor's Barlow's Report, 

on the Accident on the London and Brighton Railway.

Board of Trade, October 15, 1841.

MY LORD,

Having carefully considered the accompanying report from Professor Barlow, respecting the 
late fatal accident on the London and Brighton Railway, and, on the present state of the works on that line, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I occur with the Professor in attributing that accident partly to the excessive speed used on the occasion in question, and partly to the defective state to which the road had been reduced by the long continuance of heavy rain; hut, believing as I do, that these two causes mainly contributed to produce this unfortunate catastrophe, yet I am most decidedly of opinion that the accident would not have happened but for the improper use of two en mes a-head on a long gradient, of rather severe inclination, falling in the direction in which the train was running.

Scarcely any practice can, in my opinion, be more imprudent than running a train with two 
engines a-head on such a plane at n high velocity, even over a road well consolidated by time, and the danger of such a proceeding is obviously most fearfully increased when it is 
permitted on a line which has not acquired that degree of steadiness which is attainable only 
from long use; and, while this practice is dangerous, it is not only altogether unnecessary, but expensive to the Company.

Your Lordship will readily perceive the utter impossibility of two drivers, however dexterous they may be, so regulating the speed of their respective engines, on such a plane as that on draw chains" of both uniformly stretched, and it is quite clear that when the leading engine sometimes draws the other, and is sometimes pushed by it, an irregular motion must result, having a tendency to disturb the balance of the leading engine, and more especially if that engine be the lighter, and carried by only four wheels.The risk is much increased on a line where the evenness of the rails has been disturbed by bad weather.

In calling the attention of the London and Brighton Company therefore, to the necessity of a 
considerable reduction in their rate of speed on the falling gradients, and of paying constant 
and close attention to the state of their road, I would recommend that they should be urged to discontinue the use of the assistant engine in the descent of their long inclined planes.
A most important and very safe practice prevails on some of the northern railways, which 
should be immediately introduced on the Brighton line, and ought to be adopted on ail those 
of recent formation, as it affords an excellent, constant, and almost unerring check on the 
contractors. who are generally held responsible to maintain the road in good order for 12 
months after the opening:

The practice to which I allude, is that of making each policeman carry a gauge, and walk over his beat, before the arrival of every train, trying the gauge of the rails in such a number of points as to ascertain whether the line is throughout in perfect order; and it is the policeman’s duty to stop a train, or give the signal of caution, according to the degree of risk he may discover.

I find that the point where it is presumed the engine first became irregular in its motion, just 
before the accident, in one to which I had called the especial attention of the Company, as 
requiring careful and cautious driving and watching.

Professor Barlow very justly observes, that it will be the rase on the London and Brighton, as it is on all new lines, that for some time to come fresh weak points will be produced by 
unfavourable weather, and I therefore conceive it will be proper not only to press upon the 
Company the necessity of devoting the most vigilant and unremitting care to the state of their works generally and of the permanent way in particular, but that it will be indispensably necessary that this line, on which so large a traffic may be expected, should have the especial attention of this department, and be occasionally inspected during the winter after had weather, in order that such suggestions may from time to time be offered to the Com any as may relieve the Board of Trade from alt responsibility as regards the public safety on this railway.

I have, &C.,

FREDERIC SMITH

Letter sent to the London and Brighton Railway Company, 

with Extracts from Sir F. Smith’s and Professor Barlow's Reports.

October 19,1841

SIR, Board of Trade, 

With reference to the late accident on the London and Brighton Railway, I am directed, &C., 
to inform you that their Lordship recommend to the Directors of the London and Brighton 
Railway Company the adoption of the following precautions, which have been recommended by Sir F. Smith and Professor Barlow :-

l. That the speed in descending the long inclined places upon the line, and also upon all 
portions of the line which may appear to be not perfectly consolidated, should he reduced, 
and strict orders issued to prevent such limited rate of speed as is thought proper for safety 
from being ever exceeded.

2. That with a view to this the time-table should be revised, and the average rate of speed 
along the line, which is stated by Professor Barlow to be in some case as high as 25 miles per hour, should be considerably diminished.

3. That the practice of running trains with two engines a-head down long inclined planes, 
should be discontinued.

Sir F. Smith further suggests, that a practice which prevails on some of the northern railways 
might with advantage be adopted, as affording an excellent check on the contractors, who we responsible for maintaining the road in good order, viz., of making each policeman carry a gauge, and walk over his beat before the arrival of train, trying the gauge of the rails in such a number of points as to ascertain whether the line is throughout in good order, and making it his duty to stop or caution trains according to the degree of risk he may discover. Their Lordships recommend this suggestion for the consideration of the Directors.

Sir, Observing that in the melancholy accident on Saturday last the passengers in the first 
carriages were the only ones killed, which I recollect has generally been the case in all 
railway accidents occasioned by the engine getting off the line, it has led me suggest, either 
that the luggage of the passengers should be placed on one or two luggage trucks between the engine and first carriage, or else to have a break of some elastic material, say pass of wool made almost the length and breadth of one of the carriages, so that the first concussion would be on it, and not on the bones and heads of the poor passengers, though of course they must feel, but in a less degree, being at a greater distance from the engine than at present.