1875
WEST CROYDON
20th OCTOBER 1875
Extracted and adapted from the report by
C. S. HUTCHINSON, Licit—Col. R.E.
A collision which
occurred on the 20th ultimo, at West Croydon station,
on the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway.
In this case the 6.15 p.m. passenger train from
Victoria to West Croydon came into collision with
some empty carriages which had formed a portion
of the 5.50 p.m. passenger train from London Bridge
to West Croydon.
Four passengers are reported to have been slightly
injured.
The buffer beam of the engine and some carriage
steps in the 6.15 p.m. train were broken.
In the empty train one carriage had its under
frame broken up, another had two of its wheels thrown
off the rails, and the two rear carriages were detached
and knocked back along the line.
West Croydon station has lately been completely
resignalled, and the points and signals are now all worked from and interlocked in a commodious raised
cabin near the entrance to the station, which is a
terminal one for many of the local trains, these trains
on arrival having in consequence to be shunted and
re-arranged. For enabling this to be done without
interfering with the main up and down lines, a siding
has been put in, leading :from a dock platform line.
But when this collision occurred the use of this siding
had been temporarily given up, and the signalman
had orders to turn nothing into it, as a wall was being
built along it, and it was obstructed by scaffold poles.
The points (No. 20 lever) which act as catch points
for this shunting siding are about 40 yards on the
down side of the cabin, and the collision occurred
about 20 yards beyond them, or 60 yards from the
cabin.
Alfred Stanley, who has been a signalman for
nearly seven years, three of which he has passed in
Streatham north junction, and about two months and
a half at West Croydon, came on duty on the evening n question at, 6 p.m., for a spell of eight hours. He
was aware that an order was in force that the shunting
siding was not to be used, and had been reminded of it
by the signalman whom he had relieved. He took "on
line" the 5.50 p.m. down train from London Bridge
from St. James junction (the next block post) at 6.27,
admitted it to the dock platform and gave back "line
clear " at 6.31. At 6.36 he took " on line " the 6.10 p.m.
down train also from London Bridge, and admitted it to
the main line platform, giving back " line clear " at 6.41.
The engine of the 5.50 train having meantime run
round its train, he made the points for it to run into
the shunting siding (forgetting for the moment that
it was not to be used) and gave the driver the disc
signal allowing him to proceed, which he accordingly
did, but came in contact with a scaffold pole some
40 yards on the up side of the cabin at about 6.44.,
Stanley hearing the blow. At 6.46 Stanley took " on
line" the 6.15 train from Victoria. He looked through
his cabin window to see if the tail of the 5.50 train was
clear of the catch points of the shunting siding, but
not being able to make this out he tried No. 20 points,
and finding he could pull the lever over, concluded
without further inquiry or examination that this must
be clear; he then lowered the signal for admitting the
6.15 train to the dock platform, as the 6.10 train was
occupying the main line platform (the one to which the
6,15 train was usually admitted), the accident to the
5.50 train having prevented its being shunted. On
the collision occurring, at about 6.51, Stanley first
became aware that the empty train was foul of the
line on which he admitted the 6.15 p.m. train.
The driver of the 5.50 train, which consisted of 16
vehicles, arrived at West Croydon at 6.28, eight
minutes late from detentions by signals, and when he
had ran round his train, received the signal for
taking it into the shunting siding, which he did
cautiously (knowing that it had been under repair),
until his engine struck a scaffold pole, bringing down
some scaffolding with it. He stopped at once and
though he thought that the tail of his train could not
be clear of the dock road, he said nothing to the
signalman ; as the whole thing having occurred right
under his eyes, he considered he must be aware of
the state of things. After examination of the engine
and train, during which the station master and a
shunter had come up, he heard the 6.15 train approaching and thought it must be going to the main lino
platform; he however gave the driver a whistle with
his fingers and shouted to him to go steady; it did
not occur to him to look up to see which home-signal
was off. He felt the collision slightly on the engine.
The driver of the 6.15 train from Victoria, which
consisted of engine, tender, and seven coaches, with a
break compartment front and rear, a guard being in
the rear one, was approaching West Croydon six
minutes late (having been detained three minutes in
starting and three minutes by signals) and found the
signals off for running into the dock. Suspecting
something might be wrong, as he ordinarily ran with
this train to the main line platform, he approached
rather more slowly than usual, and on passing the
engine of the 5.50 empty train, he heard the driver
shout, not whistle, something which be could not
make out; he again looked up at the home signal,
and seeing it still off for the dock ran on, and only
saw that the empty carriages were foul of the road
on which he was running a few yards before striking
them. He had just time to reverse and put on steam
and his fireman to get an extra turn at his break
handle before his engine struck the third carriage
from the rear of the empty train (which carriage was
upset), and knocked the two rear ones back into the
dock.
The guard of the train was totally unprepared for
the collision, which knocked him down, though without
hurting him.
No wheels were knocked off the rails in the 6.15
train, which was very little damaged.
The station master was on the main down platform
attending to the 6.10 p.m. train, when he was informed that the engine of the 5.50 train had ran into
the scaffolding in the shunting siding. He at once
went up to the spot, not noticing as he passed that
the tail of the train was foul of the line leading to
the dock; as he passed the signal cabin he asked the
signalman why he had let the empty train into the
shunting siding, who replied that he had forgotten
the order. While examining what damage the train
had received, the 6.15 p.m. ran past into the dock
line and the collision occurred.
This collision was the result, first, of the forgetfulness
of an experienced signalman of the order (to which he
had had his attention directed only half an hour previously) not to use the shunting siding, and secondly, of
his want of care in not ascertaining that the tail of the
empty train was really clear of the dock line, instead of
assuming that it was so because be was able to move
a set of points between the wheels of that train.
It would only have been prudent in the driver of
the empty train to have communicated to the signalman his impression that the tail of his train was not
clear of the dock line.
It is disappointing to the company to have had
the occurrence of this collision shortly after incurring
a costly expenditure in re-arranging this station with
the latest improvements. They at any rate have the
satisfaction of feeling that they have neglected no
known means for ensuring the safety of the public
using the station, and that the present collision is
one which may fairly be put down to the item of
human fallibility.