1862

FOREST HILL

6th NOVEMBER 1862

Extracted and adapt from a report 

by W. Yolland. Colonel, Royal Engineers

A collision that occurred on the 6th November 1862 between a South-Eastern and a London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company's train during a very thick fog, on the incline between New Cross and Forest Hill stations, when 21 passengers in the South-Eastern, and one in the Brighton train were injured, in addition to the guard riding in a van at the tail of the South-Eastern train, which van was run into by the Brighton train.

The line between London Bridge and Red Hill is partly owned by the South-Eastern and partly by the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company. From London Bridge to the Black Ditch near Corbet's Lane, rather more than two miles, the line belongs to the South-Eastern ; from the Black Ditch to about one mile south of Stoat's Nest it belongs to the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, a distance of 13 miles 29 chains, and from thence to Red Hill, a length of 5 miles 50 chains the line belongs to the South-Eastern Railway Company. New Cross is distant about 2.79 miles from London Bridge and Forest Hill about 5,1; miles, and between those two stations there is an incline of I in 100 rising towards Forest Bill for upwards of 2i miles. Intermediate between these two stations a tele- graphic signal-box has been established nt No. 7 overbridge 2,880 yards south of New Cross signal box—furnished with up and down semaphore signals, which are usually called the bank signals, being situated on what is generally known as New Cross bank.

On the morning of the Gth ultimo, the 7.55 South-Eastern tidal train, consisting of engine and tender and 13 vehicles, including two breaks and two guards, left London Bridge, one minute late according to the driver, but four minutes late by the time recorded at No. 2 high signal box, and was entered iu the telegraph books as having passed Spa Road station at 8.3, Blue Anchor Lane at 8.4, Bricklayers Arms Junction at 8.5, and New Cross at 8.5. No record book is kept at No. 7 bridge, but the train was tele- graphed forward to Forest Hill, and the time 8.10 is entered there, when the signal was received from No. 7 bridge of the train having passed the bank signal station.

The 8.0 a.m. Brighton train, consisting of engine and tender, seven carriages, and two break-vans, with three guards, is entered in the telegraph books as having passed all the stations up to and inclusive of New Cross four minutes after the tidal train, and signals were received at New Cross from No. 7 bridge, showing that the tidal train had passed the bank station at 8.9, and the Brighton train at 8.13, still keeping the same interval of time between the two trains. This train is said to have been telegraphed forward to Forest Hill, but the signal was not observed, and the bells are stated to have been out of order ; but 1,400 yards south of the bank signal station the tidal train was overtaken and run into by the Brighton train, and the collision appears to have been rather a service one, as the tidal train was divided by the shock of the recoil, and the driver of the South-Eastern train was knocked off the footplate of the engine and fell with his head on the coke in the tender.

The driver of the tidal train states, "that they did not run at their usual speed to New Cross on  account of the fog, which was very dense ; that  they were not checked by any signals between London Bridge and New Cross, but received the usual platelayers all right signals on that part of the line; that his fireman was sanding nearly all the way from London, and continued doing so up New Cross bank ; that they commenced slipping so as to lose time when they got to the New Cross up-distant signal, about 600 yards south from that station ; that they passed one platelayer between New Cross and the bank signals, who stood about 100 yards on the London side of No. 7 bridge, and gave them the all right signals, at which time they  were running 14 or 15 miles an hour ; that the bank signals were all right ; that the fog at this  place was not so dense as at New Cross, and as they went on towards Forest Hill it got still better; that they could see the Forest Hill up distant signals about 150 yards, and when they were within 75 yards from the Forest Hill down distant signal, and going about 12 miles an hour, they were run into " by the Brighton train. The fireman was sanding the rails at the time, but managed to keep hold of " the rail of the engine.The driver also states, " that he did not hear any whistle from the Brighton engine, and that they were not running slow " enough on any part of the incline to allow a guard  to jump off, and he would not have risked doing so " himself.”

The fireman's testimony is to the same effect, and he adds, " that he could see to the end of his train, which would be somewhere about 100 yards in  length.” 

The head guard of the train, riding in the break at the tail of the train, states that they commenced slipping when they had got about half way up the New Cross bank, and that they were run into, when they were travelling at a speed of about 10 miles an hour ; and when further questioned on that head, said " they were running so fast  that he should not like to have jumped out ; that he heard no whistle from the Brighton train,  and he was knocked down, and for a short time  was unconscious.” 

The through guard of the tidal train says "the speed in going up the New Cross " bank was 10 or 12 miles an hour."

Three of the passengers in the South-Eastern train have, in reply to my inquiries, given their estimate of the speed at which they were travelling, at the time the collision occurred, as follows :—Dr. A. Since, of the Bank of England, says above three and not exceeding six miles an hour; Mr. Tabor, of 187, Bishopgate Street, names six miles an hour ; Mr. Williams, 47a, Stanley Street, Pimlico, says six or seven miles an hour.

The driver of the Brighton train informed me " that he ran over two fog signals, close together, before he reached New Cross station, and he shut off his steam and whistled for the guard ; that the caution signal was given to him at New Cross  switch box, and he then proceeded to No. 7 bridge; that it was very foggy, very thick, and they ran over one fog signal about 20 yards on the London side of the bridge, and he whistled to the guard to  put on his break, and shut off the steam ; that the " semaphore signal at No. 7 bridge stood at caution and he put on the steam again, and put his engine in No. 6 notch, one notch from the centre ; that he was travelling perhaps 15 miles an hour when when he ran over the fog signal, and be then proceeded carefully until he struck the other train, at which time he thinks he was running about 10 miles an hour; that he shut off the steam as soon as he saw the other train as soon as he saw the other train, which did not appear above three carriage lengths distant, as the fog was so thick; that the steam was off and the engine reversed before he struck, but he had not time to put on the steam the reverse way ; that he whistled for the breaks as soon as he saw the train, but his fireman had not time to put the tender break on, so as to get power on the wheels. He could not say whether the tidal train was moving or  standing, if it was moving it must have been very  slow. To the best of his belief he says the collision took place at 8.18 or 8.19, but he did not look at his watch until he was going up towards the South-Eastern engine, when among the passengers, when it was about 8.22."

No vehicles were thrown off the line, and but little damage was done to the engines or carriages.

When the driver was further questioned he stated that he saw the fog man on passing No. 7 bridge, on the New Cross side of the bridge, standing on the Croydon down road (his train was travelling on the main down road) and that he was about 20 yards distant when he first saw him, just opposite to the spot where the fog signal exploded : he might be a little way from it, but not far from the bridge. The fogman told him to go steady ; he was going slow enough to hear that. Just as he was going under the bridge he saw the semaphore signal; he could see it, and that was all, he did not see the signal first at danger; saw it at caution, but did not see it lowered to caution. He believes the frogman had 2 flags in his hand, and he was waving one of them, and that it was the green one; that he is sure the frogman spoke to him - saw no other man; there might be others about, but he took it to be him, and he heard the words before he came to the signal; he does not think that more than 4, 5, or 6 minutes could have elapsed between the time of the collision and when he looked at his watch, and he does not think he travelled more than 10 miles an hour after he made the reduction in speed, when the fog signal exploded.

The fireman of the Brighton train gave evidence that agreed closely with that of the driver; but stated that the speed on and after passing No.7 bridge was not more than 8 or 10 miles an hour, as they were going very cautiously, and he estimates the speed between London and New Cross at 15 miles an hour.

The head guard of the Brighton train says they left London at 8.3, and that the collision took place at 8.18; that he rode on the right hand side of the beak; that they ran over one fog signal, and he looked out for signals at No.7 bridge but could not see them, it was too foggy, although he knew exactly where to look for them, neither did he see any frogman, but his mate, riding in the same van and looking out on the left side, told him that the frogman had signalled with his hand for the train to go on; that he put his break on when they ran over the fog signal, and took it off again when his mate told him it was right to go on; that he thinks they were running from 15 to 20 miles an hour; that he did not notice the driver whistle for the breaks, but noticed that he shut the steam off, and that their was reduced to 10 miles an hour when they struck the other train.

The additional guard of the Brighton train, also riding in the front break van, says, they travelled to New Cross at 15 miles an hour and up to No.7 bridge at from 12 to 14 miles an hour; he speaks to the running over the fog signal, and seeing a frogman, but thinks he was south side of No.7 bridge, which however he never saw, and he says, the frogman waved his hand for them to go on, but he had nothing in his hand; he also says the fog was so dense that he could not see the bank signals, although he looked for them. He agrees generally with the evidence given by the guard as to putting on his break and taking it off again, and as to the speed at which they were running when the collision took place. He also stated that the fogman said something as they passed, but he could not hear what it ws. He told his mate that the frogman held out his arms, at which time he could not see the bank signals.

The frogman told me, that he stood about 40 or 50 yards north of No.7 bridge, and after the tidal train passed he put down two fog signals about the length of the engine or perhaps at rather more distance apart, and the semaphore signal was also put up to danger; that when the Brighton train came he shewed a red flag, and one of the fog signals exploded; he stood on the Croydon down line, and when the fog signal exploded the driver shut off the steam and whistled; that he did not speak to the driver, but the signalman in No.7 box whistled; he could not see the signalman as the train drove the fog before it made it very thick; he thinks the tidal train was going 6 or 7 miles an hour, and the Brighton train 15 or 16; he could see the signals were were up immediately before the Brighton train passed him, but he could not see them when the signalman whistled and the Brighton train had passed; that at the time the Brighton train passed he had not thought of taking the fog signals off the rails; he was looking to the semaphore signals to guide him. As far as he could judge there was an interval of three or four minutes between the two trains; the signals were up when the Brighton train had passed through the bridge, and he then put down three fog signals, and he did not take them off again until the signalman told him it was all clear. He says the down signal might have been lowered and have been put up again immediately after the Brighton train passed without his seeing it, as the fog was so thick that he could not see them after the train passed.

Another frogman was placed on the south side of No.7 bridge, but on the opposite side of the line, (the west side) for the purpose of signalling the up trains. He speaks to the semaphore down signal being at stop when the fog signals exploded under the Brighton train, but he was unable to say how it was when the Brighton train passed him. He says he gave a slight signal with his hand for the train to go cautious, but he did not speak, to the driver, and does not think he was seen at all. He thinks the tidal train was travelling six or seven miles an hour and the Brighton train 14 or 15. He also stated that he does not think he could have kept up with the tidal train if he had tried to do so.

A signalman, who was just going off duty at the bank signal station, informed me that he gave the all right signal for the tidal train to proceed, and telegraphed it forward to Forest Hill, and back to New Cross at about 8.10, and then he put the semaphore signal to danger; and when the Brighton train was telegraphed as leaving New Cross, he says he called out to the frogman and asked him if he had put down two fog signals, and was answered in the affirmative. He then gave up charge to the other signalman; and after the explosion of the fog signal by the Brighton train passing over it, the other signalman lowered the semaphore signal to caution. He thinks the tidal train was not travelling more than 6 to 8 miles an hour when it passed, and the Brighton from 8 to 10 and he thinks there was an interval of 4 1/2 to 5 minutes between the two trains; he also stated that if he had been in charge he should have kept up the signal to warn the driver of the Brighton train, as he thought there was danger in her following the tidal train, which was labouring and travelling slowly, not faster than he could walk, on a very foggy morning; that if the two fog signals had exploded the driver of the Brighton train should have stopped, and then he would have told him to go on, but that there was a train ahead going very slowly. The other signalman lowered the signal because the interval of time directed to be observed by the regulations between following trains had elapsed, and he was justified in doing so. The signalman actually on duty stated that it was 8.10 when the tidal train passed, and over 8.12 when the Brighton; train passed. He did not see the tidal train, but he thought the other was travelling 15 or 16 miles an hour, and the semaphore was at danger against the Brighton train until it got to within a few yards of the bridge, and then he dropped it to caution, before he thinks the engine had got through the bridge, and then he put it up again. The fog was so dense that he could scarcely see down to the line from his box. He also agrees with the other signalman as to a whistle having been sounded from the signalman’s box, in order to attract the attention of the driver; but it does not seem to have been heard. There does not appear to be any doubt but that the driver shut off his steam, and whistled for the breaks when he ran over the fog signal; but according to his own showing he went ahead again, putting on the steam as soon as he saw the semaphore signal at "caution." If the evidence of the two signalmen is to be believed, this signal was lowered in accordance with the regulations directed to be observed in working traffic up the New Cross bank. Before I pass from the immediate subject of the accident, I should add that a platelayer who was employed as a fogman north, but near theForest Hill down distant signal, informed me "that he did not see the tidal train, but heard the very slow beat of the engine, and that she had been slipping very much; that the rails were very slippery, and he " does not think the train had actually stopped, when " the engine made another start after slipping, and she hardly moved, and he does not think she was going more than three or four miles an hour when the Brighton train struck her: he did not hear any whistle before the collision took place ; he thinks the guard might have got off very easy to protect his train. And another man who was with the plate layer gave corroborative evidence very much to the same effect.

The general manager of the South-Eastern Railway (Mr. Eborall) handed in copies of correspondence which had passed between himself and the general manager of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway (Mr. Hawkins), relating principally to the question of the liability of the two companies to compensate the injured persons in the train, but also pointing out in what respect, as regards negligence, he, Mr. Eborall, considered that the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company were liable, and not the South-Eastern. Mr.Hawkins objected to this correspondence being handed to me; and I told him that I had no right to interfere with respect to deciding as to which company was liable to the passengers, but that as acts amounting to negligence were pointed out, I was bound to receive it on those grounds, and to make further inquiry on that head.

Mr. Eborall then proceeded to make a statement bearing upon the mode in which the traffic over the joint line between London and Red Hill was worked. And he handed in the paper A.containing an extract from the agreement of 1848 for the working of the joint line, in which it is stipulated that the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company shall at all times hereafter maintain all the parts of their railways over which the South-Eastern Railway Company shall been titled under this agreement to carry any traffic toll free, in substantial repair  and condition, and effectually guarded and watched, as shall be requisite for the secure passage of such  traffic thereon : and he proceeded to say, “ that he had for many years urged upon the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company the propriety of introducing the telegraphic system of signalling trains on their portion of the line between London and Red Hill. and in October 1857, the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway issued the printed regulations dated the 25th of that mouth, annexed paper B.; that he had been anxious to hare a joint set a telegraphic rules and semaphore signals to apply to the whole distance between London and Red Hill, but there were differences of opinion between the officers of the two companies, and it was at length agreed on for the Brighton Company to have their system on the line belonging to them and the South Eastern to work their own system on their own line.

Mr. Eborall stated that since time he had been extremely anxious as to the carrying out of these regulations, and in 1861 he instructed the South Eastern telegraphic superintendent, Mr. Walker, by an arrangement with Mr. Hawkins, to see their telegraphic superintendent, Mr.Cripps; and that these gentlemen met, compared notes, and it would appear " from the joint report of these gentlemen that there was no deviation from the system agreed upon on " the 25th October 1857. This is supported by the copy of a note from Mr. Cripps to Mr.Walker, enclosing a copy of the printed paper B., in which no allusion is made to any change in the telegraphic signalling of trains having been made.

Mr. Eborall further stated, that within the last three or four months he had had correspondence with Mr. Hawkins upon the telegraphic signalling of trains between places on the joint line to Red Hill, and had tried to impress upon him the desirability of adopting the block system of telegraphing, seeing the large amount of traffic on the line to Red Hill and the speed of the trains; and had pointed out the risk of collision at the Croydon Station for up trains whilst trains were standing at the East. Croydon Station, or whilst shunting was going on on the London side of the East Croydon Station, near to the signals. Subsequently he received a communication from Mr.Hawkins objecting to that mode of signalling.

Now it appears that in January 1858 an exceptional system of telegraphing down trains was introduced between New Cross and Forest Hill, dated the 25th (paperC.), and Mr. Hawkins states that these were introduced in consequence, not of an accident having actually occurred, but of several close approaches to them, and of very great delay and inconvenience in consequence of trains being stopped on the bank, from the difficulty of again starting on an incline of 1 in 100. And Mr. Eborall complains of the introduction of such an exceptional rule, and says "that he was not made aware of its introduction, and that no notice was ever given to Into that this exceptional rule had been placed in the signal boxes at New Cross, No. 7 bridge, and Forest Hill, and that he considers such an exceptional rule vitiates the character of the London, " Brighton, and South Coast telegraphic system, as laid down in the instructions of the 25th October " 1857."

The 4th rule inserted in the regulations of the 25th October 1857 says, that a second train on arriving at a telegraphic signal station " may, after coming to " a stand-still, and after the fixed time has elapsed and the signalman has warned the driver by word of mouth that the line in front is not signalled clear, be allowed to proceed with caution, provided always that the STOP ALL, or danger signal herein-after mentioned, has not been communicated from the next station.

The exceptional rule for the New Cross Bank complained of by Mr. Eborall, and dated the 25th January 1858, cancels the previous rule for trains arid engines running on the down main and Croydon lines, and substitutes the following:-
Thenceforward you must not stop a train or engine for the In signal of the previous train at the next station. You may, by caution signal, allow trains and engines to follow one another without interruption, provided always that they do so at an interval of not less than three minutes according to general rule No. 36. and provided also that you have not received the stop all or danger signal from the next station.

This exceptional rule was acted upon on the 6th November, 1862. The Brighton train, according to the signalman, followed the South-Eastern train past No. 7 bridge, or the bank signal station, at an intervals exceeding three minutes prescribed by the regulation, it might be four minutes—at a time when the fog was so thick that the signalman could scarcely see the line, and when fogmen were stationed to place fog signals on the rails in obedience to the indications of the semaphore signals, and in four minutes the collision takes place at a distance of 1,400 yards past the bank signal, over which distance the driver of the Brighton train ; must have travelled at the average rate of about 12 miles an hour, although he had been warned by the explosion of a fog signal that there was " danger" a head—and had both fog signals exploded, it would, in accordance with the Company's regulations, have signified extreme danger to the Brighton train. By a comparison of the times recorded at the several signal stations, it would appear that the South-Eastern train had travelled rather faster from London to New Cross than the Brighton train ; from New Cross to the bank signal station they travelled at the same average rate, 23.4 miles an hour, and above the bank signal station the South Eastern average was not quite six miles an hour, while the Brighton, as stated above, is nearly double that rate, assuming the collision to have taken place at 8. 18, and the two trains to have respectively passed the bank signal station at 8. 10 and 8.14.

I do not think there is sufficient evidence to prove that the guard of the South-Eastern train neglected his duty in not getting out of his van and going back to protect it, but I think there is ample to show that the driver of the Brighton train was not proceeding with sufficient caution. His statement about his having been told to go steady is contradicted by the fogman, who says he showed a red flag ; the explosion of the fog signal is admitted, and both of these are " danger " signals, and should have induced caution eves though he did see the semaphore signal lowered to caution.

The collision, however, clearly proves, that the existing regulations for working the traffic during thick and foggy weather are insufficient, whatever they may be under ordinary circumstances ; and I think Mr. Eborall makes out his case, that in this instance the line has not been effectually guarded and watched, and that the introduction of the exceptional instructions of the 25th January 1858, virtually abolishing the telegraphic system between New Cross and Forest Hill for down trains, was  instrumental in producing the late collision.

Mr. Eborall urges the adoption of the block system of working by telegraph over the line between London and Red Hill, and states that the fundamental rule on the South-Eastern Railway is " that two engines or " trains are not allowable between any two stations at the same time, except if a failure should arise in the telegraph apparatus, and that the train is not to leave, if the danger signal has been given against it " by the speaking instrument. He says, that in practically working out this lute their tidal and express trains are frequently kept 10 or 15 minutes and more, and ho hands in a return illustrative of the South-Eastern system of telegraphing trains and keeping clear space between signalling station, showing the trains stopped and kept waiting during two weeks ; also that they have a speaking instrument at every station night and day, with distinct wires in addition to the train instruments ; but the company have hitherto excepted certain stations, where shunting must be done, and have allowed trains to proceed towards these stations before the in signal has been received, in order to avoid unnecessarily delaying their trains ; but pointed out that this was a decided blot on their system, which could easily be removed by covering every shunting station with a telegraphic signal station at its two extremities, properly provided with the usual out-of-door signals. Mr. Eborall admitted the existence of what might be considered as a detect, and said that the propriety of changing it had already been under consideration, and when I last saw him he told me they had determined to get id of it. In this way, the adoption of the block system of telegraphing will not involve delays to trains approaching stations where shunting must, more or less, be always going on, as a train will run up to the telegraph station at one extremity of the station, by which time the station yard may be cleared as regards the main line on which the train is proceeding.

Mr. Hawkins pointed out that the regulations of the 25th Oct. 1857 were in complete accordance with the printed regulations of the South-Eastern Railway Company, with an additional precaution of causing the train to come to a stand still; and he referred to No. 124. of the South-Eastern regulations, which says should the in signal of a previous train or engine fail to arrive, or the out signal of a starting train or engine fail to be taken, the train or engine " may go in with caution,; provided the stop all or " danger signal has not been: made: against it" in proof of his statement :— but in reply, Mr. Eborall said that their practice was as I have already stated it, and that the “ top all” or “danger” signal referred to could only be obtained through the speaking telegraph. He admitted the ambiguity of the rule, as well calculated to mislead the officers of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company.

I shall have occasion to refer to this subject again when reporting upon the collision that occurred on the 17th November 1862, a short distance south of East Croydon station ; but I would strongly press upon the directors and officers of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company the propriety of cancelling the order of the 25th January 1858, and reverting to the instructions of the 25th October 1857, if they cannot, which I think highly desirable, determine to adopt the block system of working on the whole of their portion of line between London and Red Hill, introducing probably two additional telegraph stations on the New Cross bank between New Cross and Forest Hill, and thus adopting a uniform system of working on the joint line between London and Red Hill. An interval of time is certainly no protection at all, when the circumstances are so unfavourable as they were on this occasion, and I believe it to be, under any circumstances, uncertain and deceptive.

On the day on which the accident occurred there were no less than 82 up and 82 down trains on the main line between New Cross and Forest Hill, the South-Eastern having the preponderance as regards the up trains ; and 83 up and 81 down trains on the Croydon lines, which are east and west of the main lines, all belonging to the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, which has, therefore, a much greater interest in establishing a safe system of working than the South-Eastern Railway Company, over this portion of the joint line. 

LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY

SYSTEM OF SIGNALLING TRAINS 

BY ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH

Between the Bricklayer's Arms Junction and Stoat's Nest station, including the Crystal Palace branch and the Croydon up and down lines between Bricklayer's Arms Junction, and West Croydon.

Commencing Sunday, 25th October, 1857.
Note.—The signalling of trains by electric telegraph does not in any way alter the common rules for working station and distant signals, nor does it in any way affect the common rules for using hand signals or fog signals, when and wheresoever such signals may be requisite.

Drivers and guards are especially warned not to place independent reliance on the electric telegraph. They will be held responsible solely for obedience to the signals given or exhibited to them.

The chief use of the electric telegraph for signalling trains is to prevent accident from trains or engines following each other too closely on the same lines between stations where signals are fixed ; but it does not control obstructions at stations or junctions, as at those places the proper working of the fixed signals must alone be regarded and depended upon for the safety of the traffic.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR WORKING ELECTRIC 

TELEGRAPH SIGNALS.


In conjunction with station fixed signals. 

1.—So long as a line is clear for the passing of trains or engines the telegraph indicator shall stand at”Clear” and the station signals shall show "All Right." (Except at Junctions where the semaphore signals stand at Slop until altered for the passing of a train or engine.)

2.—Every train or engine that starts from or passes a signalling station must be immediately signalled " OUT " to the next station.

3. Every train or engine that arrives at or passes a station must be immediately signalled back "IN" to the last station.

4.—No second train or engine must be allowed to follow until the “IN " signal of the previous train or engine at the next station has been taken ; nor then, until the period of time allowed between trains or engines following one another on the same line has elapsed (according to General Rules and Regulations), but if from any failure of the telegraphic communication or other cause the”IN” signal of the previous train or engine shall fail to be given or taken, and in the meanwhile a second train or engine shall have arrived, it may,—after coming to a stand still and after the fixed time has elapsed and the signalman has warned the driver by word of mouth that the line in front is not signalled clear,—be
allowed to proceed with caution, provided always that the " STOP ALL" or danger signal herein-after mentioned has not been communicated from the next station.

5. The "STOP ALL" or "DANGER" Signal must only be given in case of accident causing obstruction between stations, i.e., beyond the protection of the fixed signals; and whenever such signal shall have been communicated to any station, the signals thereat for the line or lines blocked shall remain at " STOP," and nothing must be allowed to pass until a second signal is received that the line is again clear. (Except under the special direction of a station master or superior officer.)

6.—No telegraphic signal is completed until accepted and repeated by the station to which it is sent. If a signal is not so accepted and repeated, it must be given again, and the irregularity reported to the station master.


CODES.

1.—Between BRICKLAYER'S ARMS JUNCTION, NORWOOD and WEST CROYDON.
Including
Bricklayer's Arms Junction, New Cross switch box signals, New Cross bank signals, Forest Hill,*  Sydenham,* Annerly, Norwood, West Croydon.
ONE  (ring for a Croydon or Crystal Palace train or engine) OUT
TWO (rings for every train or engine ) OUT
FOUR rings for everything OUT. THREE rings for everything IN.
TWO (rings for a Brighton train or engine) OUT. 
THREE (ring for every train or engine) IN
The " STOP ALL," or DANGER SIGNAL.
FIVE rings is the signal to stop EVERYTHING. 
THREE (ring for every train or engine) IN
* Four rings for down Crystal Palace trains from Forest Hill to Sydenham
II —Between CRYSTAL PALACE and SYDENHAM.

FOUR (rings for everything) OUT         THREE (rings for everything) 

III—Between NORWOOD and STOAT’S NEST STATION.
Including Norwood Junction, East Croydon, Caterham Junction. and Stoat's Nest.
ONE (ring for a South-Eastern train or engine) OUT
Two"IN" signals,-- namely, THREE rings, given and taken TWICE is a signal that the obstruction is removed.
EIGHT rings is the signal for testing the Bells. 
GEORGE HAWKINS, Traffic Manager.

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