1862
FOREST HILL
6th NOVEMBER 1862
Extracted and adapt from a report
by W. Yolland. Colonel, Royal Engineers
A collision that occurred on the 6th November 1862 between a South-Eastern and a London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company's train during a very thick fog, on the incline between New Cross and Forest Hill stations, when 21 passengers in the South-Eastern, and one in the Brighton train were injured, in addition to the guard riding in a van at the tail of the South-Eastern train, which van was run into by the Brighton train.
The line between London Bridge and Red Hill is partly owned by the South-Eastern and partly by the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company. From London Bridge to the Black Ditch near Corbet's Lane, rather more than two miles, the line belongs to the South-Eastern ; from the Black Ditch to about one mile south of Stoat's Nest it belongs to the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, a distance of 13 miles 29 chains, and from thence to Red Hill, a length of 5 miles 50 chains the line belongs to the South-Eastern Railway Company. New Cross is distant about 2.79 miles from London Bridge and Forest Hill about 5,1; miles, and between those two stations there is an incline of I in 100 rising towards Forest Bill for upwards of 2i miles. Intermediate between these two stations a tele- graphic signal-box has been established nt No. 7 overbridge 2,880 yards south of New Cross signal box—furnished with up and down semaphore signals, which are usually called the bank signals, being situated on what is generally known as New Cross bank.
On the morning of the Gth ultimo, the 7.55 South-Eastern tidal train, consisting of engine and tender and 13 vehicles, including two breaks and two guards, left London Bridge, one minute late according to the driver, but four minutes late by the time recorded at No. 2 high signal box, and was entered iu the telegraph books as having passed Spa Road station at 8.3, Blue Anchor Lane at 8.4, Bricklayers Arms Junction at 8.5, and New Cross at 8.5. No record book is kept at No. 7 bridge, but the train was tele- graphed forward to Forest Hill, and the time 8.10 is entered there, when the signal was received from No. 7 bridge of the train having passed the bank signal station.
The 8.0 a.m. Brighton train, consisting of engine and tender, seven carriages, and two break-vans, with three guards, is entered in the telegraph books as having passed all the stations up to and inclusive of New Cross four minutes after the tidal train, and signals were received at New Cross from No. 7 bridge, showing that the tidal train had passed the bank station at 8.9, and the Brighton train at 8.13, still keeping the same interval of time between the two trains. This train is said to have been telegraphed forward to Forest Hill, but the signal was not observed, and the bells are stated to have been out of order ; but 1,400 yards south of the bank signal station the tidal train was overtaken and run into by the Brighton train, and the collision appears to have been rather a service one, as the tidal train was divided by the shock of the recoil, and the driver of the South-Eastern train was knocked off the footplate of the engine and fell with his head on the coke in the tender.
The driver of the tidal train states, "that they did not run at their usual speed to New Cross on account of the fog, which was very dense ; that they were not checked by any signals between London Bridge and New Cross, but received the usual platelayers all right signals on that part of the line; that his fireman was sanding nearly all the way from London, and continued doing so up New Cross bank ; that they commenced slipping so as to lose time when they got to the New Cross up-distant signal, about 600 yards south from that station ; that they passed one platelayer between New Cross and the bank signals, who stood about 100 yards on the London side of No. 7 bridge, and gave them the all right signals, at which time they were running 14 or 15 miles an hour ; that the bank signals were all right ; that the fog at this place was not so dense as at New Cross, and as they went on towards Forest Hill it got still better; that they could see the Forest Hill up distant signals about 150 yards, and when they were within 75 yards from the Forest Hill down distant signal, and going about 12 miles an hour, they were run into " by the Brighton train. The fireman was sanding the rails at the time, but managed to keep hold of " the rail of the engine.The driver also states, " that he did not hear any whistle from the Brighton engine, and that they were not running slow " enough on any part of the incline to allow a guard to jump off, and he would not have risked doing so " himself.”
The fireman's testimony is to the same effect, and he adds, " that he could see to the end of his train, which would be somewhere about 100 yards in length.”
The head guard of the train, riding in the break at the tail of the train, states that they commenced slipping when they had got about half way up the New Cross bank, and that they were run into, when they were travelling at a speed of about 10 miles an hour ; and when further questioned on that head, said " they were running so fast that he should not like to have jumped out ; that he heard no whistle from the Brighton train, and he was knocked down, and for a short time was unconscious.”
The through guard of the tidal train says "the speed in going up the New Cross " bank was 10 or 12 miles an hour."
Three of the passengers in the South-Eastern train have, in reply to my inquiries, given their estimate of the speed at which they were travelling, at the time the collision occurred, as follows :—Dr. A. Since, of the Bank of England, says above three and not exceeding six miles an hour; Mr. Tabor, of 187, Bishopgate Street, names six miles an hour ; Mr. Williams, 47a, Stanley Street, Pimlico, says six or seven miles an hour.
The driver of the Brighton train informed me " that he ran over two fog signals, close together, before he reached New Cross station, and he shut off his steam and whistled for the guard ; that the caution signal was given to him at New Cross switch box, and he then proceeded to No. 7 bridge; that it was very foggy, very thick, and they ran over one fog signal about 20 yards on the London side of the bridge, and he whistled to the guard to put on his break, and shut off the steam ; that the " semaphore signal at No. 7 bridge stood at caution and he put on the steam again, and put his engine in No. 6 notch, one notch from the centre ; that he was travelling perhaps 15 miles an hour when when he ran over the fog signal, and be then proceeded carefully until he struck the other train, at which time he thinks he was running about 10 miles an hour; that he shut off the steam as soon as he saw the other train as soon as he saw the other train, which did not appear above three carriage lengths distant, as the fog was so thick; that the steam was off and the engine reversed before he struck, but he had not time to put on the steam the reverse way ; that he whistled for the breaks as soon as he saw the train, but his fireman had not time to put the tender break on, so as to get power on the wheels. He could not say whether the tidal train was moving or standing, if it was moving it must have been very slow. To the best of his belief he says the collision took place at 8.18 or 8.19, but he did not look at his watch until he was going up towards the South-Eastern engine, when among the passengers, when it was about 8.22."
No vehicles were thrown off the line, and but little damage was done to the engines or carriages.
When the driver was further questioned he stated that he saw the fog man on passing No. 7 bridge, on the New Cross side of the bridge, standing on the Croydon down road (his train was travelling on the main down road) and that he was about 20 yards distant when he first saw him, just opposite to the spot where the fog signal exploded : he might be a little way from it, but not far from the bridge. The fogman told him to go steady ; he was going slow enough to hear that. Just as he was going under the bridge he saw the semaphore signal; he could see it, and that was all, he did not see the signal first at danger; saw it at caution, but did not see it lowered to caution. He believes the frogman had 2 flags in his hand, and he was waving one of them, and that it was the green one; that he is sure the frogman spoke to him - saw no other man; there might be others about, but he took it to be him, and he heard the words before he came to the signal; he does not think that more than 4, 5, or 6 minutes could have elapsed between the time of the collision and when he looked at his watch, and he does not think he travelled more than 10 miles an hour after he made the reduction in speed, when the fog signal exploded.
The fireman of the Brighton train gave evidence that agreed closely with that of the driver; but stated that the speed on and after passing No.7 bridge was not more than 8 or 10 miles an hour, as they were going very cautiously, and he estimates the speed between London and New Cross at 15 miles an hour.
The head guard of the Brighton train says they left London at 8.3, and that the collision took place at 8.18; that he rode on the right hand side of the beak; that they ran over one fog signal, and he looked out for signals at No.7 bridge but could not see them, it was too foggy, although he knew exactly where to look for them, neither did he see any frogman, but his mate, riding in the same van and looking out on the left side, told him that the frogman had signalled with his hand for the train to go on; that he put his break on when they ran over the fog signal, and took it off again when his mate told him it was right to go on; that he thinks they were running from 15 to 20 miles an hour; that he did not notice the driver whistle for the breaks, but noticed that he shut the steam off, and that their was reduced to 10 miles an hour when they struck the other train.
The additional guard of the Brighton train, also riding in the front break van, says, they travelled to New Cross at 15 miles an hour and up to No.7 bridge at from 12 to 14 miles an hour; he speaks to the running over the fog signal, and seeing a frogman, but thinks he was south side of No.7 bridge, which however he never saw, and he says, the frogman waved his hand for them to go on, but he had nothing in his hand; he also says the fog was so dense that he could not see the bank signals, although he looked for them. He agrees generally with the evidence given by the guard as to putting on his break and taking it off again, and as to the speed at which they were running when the collision took place. He also stated that the fogman said something as they passed, but he could not hear what it ws. He told his mate that the frogman held out his arms, at which time he could not see the bank signals.
The frogman told me, that he stood about 40 or 50 yards north of No.7 bridge, and after the tidal train passed he put down two fog signals about the length of the engine or perhaps at rather more distance apart, and the semaphore signal was also put up to danger; that when the Brighton train came he shewed a red flag, and one of the fog signals exploded; he stood on the Croydon down line, and when the fog signal exploded the driver shut off the steam and whistled; that he did not speak to the driver, but the signalman in No.7 box whistled; he could not see the signalman as the train drove the fog before it made it very thick; he thinks the tidal train was going 6 or 7 miles an hour, and the Brighton train 15 or 16; he could see the signals were were up immediately before the Brighton train passed him, but he could not see them when the signalman whistled and the Brighton train had passed; that at the time the Brighton train passed he had not thought of taking the fog signals off the rails; he was looking to the semaphore signals to guide him. As far as he could judge there was an interval of three or four minutes between the two trains; the signals were up when the Brighton train had passed through the bridge, and he then put down three fog signals, and he did not take them off again until the signalman told him it was all clear. He says the down signal might have been lowered and have been put up again immediately after the Brighton train passed without his seeing it, as the fog was so thick that he could not see them after the train passed.
Another frogman was placed on the south side of No.7 bridge, but on the opposite side of the line, (the west side) for the purpose of signalling the up trains. He speaks to the semaphore down signal being at stop when the fog signals exploded under the Brighton train, but he was unable to say how it was when the Brighton train passed him. He says he gave a slight signal with his hand for the train to go cautious, but he did not speak, to the driver, and does not think he was seen at all. He thinks the tidal train was travelling six or seven miles an hour and the Brighton train 14 or 15. He also stated that he does not think he could have kept up with the tidal train if he had tried to do so.A signalman, who was just going off duty at the bank signal station, informed me that he gave the all right signal for the tidal train to proceed, and telegraphed it forward to Forest Hill, and back to New Cross at about 8.10, and then he put the semaphore signal to danger; and when the Brighton train was telegraphed as leaving New Cross, he says he called out to the frogman and asked him if he had put down two fog signals, and was answered in the affirmative. He then gave up charge to the other signalman; and after the explosion of the fog signal by the Brighton train passing over it, the other signalman lowered the semaphore signal to caution. He thinks the tidal train was not travelling more than 6 to 8 miles an hour when it passed, and the Brighton from 8 to 10 and he thinks there was an interval of 4 1/2 to 5 minutes between the two trains; he also stated that if he had been in charge he should have kept up the signal to warn the driver of the Brighton train, as he thought there was danger in her following the tidal train, which was labouring and travelling slowly, not faster than he could walk, on a very foggy morning; that if the two fog signals had exploded the driver of the Brighton train should have stopped, and then he would have told him to go on, but that there was a train ahead going very slowly. The other signalman lowered the signal because the interval of time directed to be observed by the regulations between following trains had elapsed, and he was justified in doing so. The signalman actually on duty stated that it was 8.10 when the tidal train passed, and over 8.12 when the Brighton; train passed. He did not see the tidal train, but he thought the other was travelling 15 or 16 miles an hour, and the semaphore was at danger against the Brighton train until it got to within a few yards of the bridge, and then he dropped it to caution, before he thinks the engine had got through the bridge, and then he put it up again. The fog was so dense that he could scarcely see down to the line from his box. He also agrees with the other signalman as to a whistle having been sounded from the signalman’s box, in order to attract the attention of the driver; but it does not seem to have been heard. There does not appear to be any doubt but that the driver shut off his steam, and whistled for the breaks when he ran over the fog signal; but according to his own showing he went ahead again, putting on the steam as soon as he saw the semaphore signal at "caution." If the evidence of the two signalmen is to be believed, this signal was lowered in accordance with the regulations directed to be observed in working traffic up the New Cross bank. Before I pass from the immediate subject of the accident, I should add that a platelayer who was employed as a fogman north, but near theForest Hill down distant signal, informed me "that he did not see the tidal train, but heard the very slow beat of the engine, and that she had been slipping very much; that the rails were very slippery, and he " does not think the train had actually stopped, when " the engine made another start after slipping, and she hardly moved, and he does not think she was going more than three or four miles an hour when the Brighton train struck her: he did not hear any whistle before the collision took place ; he thinks the guard might have got off very easy to protect his train. And another man who was with the plate layer gave corroborative evidence very much to the same effect.
No vehicles were thrown off the line, and but little damage was done to the engines or carriages.
When the driver was further questioned he stated that he saw the fog man on passing No. 7 bridge, on the New Cross side of the bridge, standing on the Croydon down road (his train was travelling on the main down road) and that he was about 20 yards distant when he first saw him, just opposite to the spot where the fog signal exploded : he might be a little way from it, but not far from the bridge. The fogman told him to go steady ; he was going slow enough to hear that. Just as he was going under the bridge he saw the semaphore signal; he could see it, and that was all, he did not see the signal first at danger; saw it at caution, but did not see it lowered to caution. He believes the frogman had 2 flags in his hand, and he was waving one of them, and that it was the green one; that he is sure the frogman spoke to him - saw no other man; there might be others about, but he took it to be him, and he heard the words before he came to the signal; he does not think that more than 4, 5, or 6 minutes could have elapsed between the time of the collision and when he looked at his watch, and he does not think he travelled more than 10 miles an hour after he made the reduction in speed, when the fog signal exploded.
The fireman of the Brighton train gave evidence that agreed closely with that of the driver; but stated that the speed on and after passing No.7 bridge was not more than 8 or 10 miles an hour, as they were going very cautiously, and he estimates the speed between London and New Cross at 15 miles an hour.
The head guard of the Brighton train says they left London at 8.3, and that the collision took place at 8.18; that he rode on the right hand side of the beak; that they ran over one fog signal, and he looked out for signals at No.7 bridge but could not see them, it was too foggy, although he knew exactly where to look for them, neither did he see any frogman, but his mate, riding in the same van and looking out on the left side, told him that the frogman had signalled with his hand for the train to go on; that he put his break on when they ran over the fog signal, and took it off again when his mate told him it was right to go on; that he thinks they were running from 15 to 20 miles an hour; that he did not notice the driver whistle for the breaks, but noticed that he shut the steam off, and that their was reduced to 10 miles an hour when they struck the other train.
The additional guard of the Brighton train, also riding in the front break van, says, they travelled to New Cross at 15 miles an hour and up to No.7 bridge at from 12 to 14 miles an hour; he speaks to the running over the fog signal, and seeing a frogman, but thinks he was south side of No.7 bridge, which however he never saw, and he says, the frogman waved his hand for them to go on, but he had nothing in his hand; he also says the fog was so dense that he could not see the bank signals, although he looked for them. He agrees generally with the evidence given by the guard as to putting on his break and taking it off again, and as to the speed at which they were running when the collision took place. He also stated that the fogman said something as they passed, but he could not hear what it ws. He told his mate that the frogman held out his arms, at which time he could not see the bank signals.
The frogman told me, that he stood about 40 or 50 yards north of No.7 bridge, and after the tidal train passed he put down two fog signals about the length of the engine or perhaps at rather more distance apart, and the semaphore signal was also put up to danger; that when the Brighton train came he shewed a red flag, and one of the fog signals exploded; he stood on the Croydon down line, and when the fog signal exploded the driver shut off the steam and whistled; that he did not speak to the driver, but the signalman in No.7 box whistled; he could not see the signalman as the train drove the fog before it made it very thick; he thinks the tidal train was going 6 or 7 miles an hour, and the Brighton train 15 or 16; he could see the signals were were up immediately before the Brighton train passed him, but he could not see them when the signalman whistled and the Brighton train had passed; that at the time the Brighton train passed he had not thought of taking the fog signals off the rails; he was looking to the semaphore signals to guide him. As far as he could judge there was an interval of three or four minutes between the two trains; the signals were up when the Brighton train had passed through the bridge, and he then put down three fog signals, and he did not take them off again until the signalman told him it was all clear. He says the down signal might have been lowered and have been put up again immediately after the Brighton train passed without his seeing it, as the fog was so thick that he could not see them after the train passed.
Another frogman was placed on the south side of No.7 bridge, but on the opposite side of the line, (the west side) for the purpose of signalling the up trains. He speaks to the semaphore down signal being at stop when the fog signals exploded under the Brighton train, but he was unable to say how it was when the Brighton train passed him. He says he gave a slight signal with his hand for the train to go cautious, but he did not speak, to the driver, and does not think he was seen at all. He thinks the tidal train was travelling six or seven miles an hour and the Brighton train 14 or 15. He also stated that he does not think he could have kept up with the tidal train if he had tried to do so.