On the 17th February, at London Bridge station, between a London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company s down passenger train, and a Midland Railway Company’s goods engine.

No persons are stated to have been hurt.

The Brighton Company’s engine, No. 262, had the left-hand buffer-beam and the right-hand frame and outside angle lines badly bent, left hand foot plating bent, and the angle lines of buffer-beam bent and broken ; three buffers broken, and the drawbar and coupling bent.
No. 608, third-class break, was a good deal damaged.

The Midland Company’s engine, No. 785, had the right hand trailing buffer and buffer-beam broken, and the framing bent, and the vacuum break pipes damaged.

Description.
The South Eastern Railway Company s yard at London Bridge is situated on a low level between the London Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company’s down main line and the South-Eastern Railway Company’s up main line and understand was used as South Eastern Company s London Bridge passenger station prior to opening railway from Charing Cross to London Bridge.

The usual catch or throw points or blind sidings have not been introduced on these siding lines, a short distance back from connections with the passenger lines ground disc-signals are placed alongside the junction points these siding lines but in the absence these catch points, &c there is nothing to prevent an engine-driver from running out goods yard and fouling the down passenger line or the engine driver may inadvertently overrun disc signal, or not see or disregard its indications, and thus foul the passenger line..

The London, Brighton, and South Coast and the South Eastern Company s traffic into and out of their London Bridge stations is provided for in four signal cabins north north and south cabins on south-western side for the London Brighton and South Coast Company s traffic and the C. D. and A.B signal boxes on the opposite side for the South Eastern Company traffic.

The south box is about 85 yards nearer to the London Bridge Brighton Company’s station 
than the South Eastern A.B box and the north box is 146 yards still nearer to the passenger station than the south box there being also some signals on girder bridge over the lines yards from south box and 43 yards from the north box. 

The A B. and C D. signal boxes belonging to the South Eastern Railway Company, are 254 yards apart, from centre to centre.

The A B. South Eastern signal box is distant about 650 yards from the north or terminal end the South Eastern goods yard at London Bridge and trailing points at which the South Eastern goods siding line (on which the Midland engine had been running) joins the Brighton down main line 88 yards or north west of the A.B. signal box and junction of the Brighton Company s down main line, with the South Eastern goods siding line, is protected by a ground disc signal worked from the A B. box and placed yards further north west than the trailing points this junction.

Between this ground disc signal and these trailing points there is another pair of points for connecting this South Eastern siding line with South Eastern up main line, placed 38 yards of the other trailing points. The Midland goods engine, when left the South Eastern goods yard had stopped about yards west of the first pair trailing points, and the collision occurred spot.

The signalling between the Brighton Company s south signal box and the South Eastern Company s A B. box is interlocked to the extent that the signals for trains to leave the Brighton Company s station by their down main line cannot be taken off when the disc signal to which have referred, has been taken off by the signalman in the A B box for goods engine to come out of the South Eastern and in a similar manner disc signal cannot be taken off for a goods engine to leave the goods yard when signals have been exhibited for be taken when by signalman in Company goods yard;Brighton down passenger train to leave the Brighton Company’ station.

If proper look out had been kept on the Brighton Company s engine, the engine
driver would have been enabled to see Midland Company’s goods engine was foul the line on which ho running, at a distance of about 100 yards.

Evidence

Peter Thompson, signalman, Brighton Company’s north box (east side), London Bridge yard (three years in the box). I was on duty on Saturday, 17th February, at 6 a.m., and remained till 1.30 p.m. I rang the Crystal Palace out train to the south box at 7.30 a.m., and the release stop was removed directly afterwards. This enabled me at once to lower the platform signal for the train to start, which I did. The 7.30 a.m. train then started from No. 4 line. I noticed the signals at A.B. box were set at clear for the 7.30 train. This was previous to my signal being lowered. i saw nothing obstruction the line for the 7.30 train when I lowered the signal. I saw nothing unusual till the collision took place, and was then attached by the noise of the two engines meeting. That would be about 7.32 or 7.33 a.m. I have no knowledge of what was occurring on the South Eastern siding. i do not know whether the Midland engine, No 785, which was run into was standing still or moving. It was rather hazy morning. I could see the signals over the bridge.

Sydney Freeman, signalman in the Brighton Company’s south box; four years in that box. I was on duty on the morning of Saturday, 17th February, at 6 a.m. At 7.30 a.m. the Crystal Palace train was signalled to to me from the north box. I immediately gave it on to the A.B. (South Eastern box). A.B. lowered my electric semaphore signal, and released the trailing points, moved by lever No. 50, which usually stand right for the South Eastern line to or from the low level station. This enabled me to shift the points and pull off my slotting gear at the north box. Everything was all right, and the signals off for the Brighton Company s train to leave the station. The Brighton train started, and came out all right till nearly abreast of my box ; it had not quite reached my box when I saw a Midland Company s engine run out from the low level on to the down line in front of the Brighton Company s train. I was in the middle of the locking frame and saw the train about a carriage length in the rear of the engine, which had then stopped. The Midland engine had not been at a stand half a second before the collision occurred. I cannot say that I saw the Midland driver reversing his engine. I ran round the frame to the window, and when I got there the train ran into the engine. I had no time to do anything to aver the collision. The engine was standing still at the time of the collision. I could not work either my points or signal for the down lines unless permitted by the signalman in the South Eastern A.B. box. There is no connexion between my box and the disc signals in the South Eastern low level siding. I did not hear the Brighton Company’s engine whistle before the collision took place. I cannot say if it slackened speed before the collision. I could not say whether the steam was on or off on the Brighton engine. I do not know whether the breaks has been employed on the Brighton engine. I did not see the disc signal.

William Hoadley, in the service of the Brighton Company 12 years, and six years engine driver. Was driver of 7.30 a.in. train, with tank engine No. 262, from London Bridge on Saturday last to Victoria, via Crystal Palace. I received signal to start from the head porter on No.4 platform at 7.32 a.m. from No. 4 line. The starting signal at the end of the platform, the signal on the girder bridge, and the signal at A.B. were all off for me to go away with my train before I started. Between the girder bridge signal bridge and A.B. box I ran into a Midland engine on the out road I was running on. I was close on the Midland engine, say four yards, before I saw it, owing to the curve, and there being a thick ground mist at the time. I saw on the left hand side of the engine in the direction we were running chimney first standing under cover of the cab. Directly I saw the engine I shut iff the steam and applied the Westinghouse automatic air break, which was fitted to both engine and train. The train consisted of 10 vehicles, including two break carriages, with two guards. We had 55lbs pressure of air when the break was applied. We stopped almost immediately, owing to the action of the air break, and to the best of my belief we were going about six miles an hour when we struck the Midland engine. My mate said nothing to me, nor called my attention, in any way, before the collision occurred. I got off my engine and found the Midland engine was separate from my engine, and about one two yards ahead. It was knocked there by force of the collision. Nothing was thrown off the rails, and no one was hurt, so far as I was aware. I cannot say if the Midland engine was at a standstill or coming towards me when the mishap occurred, i.e., when I struck it. my engine was damaged, as well s the leading break carriage. I saw nothing or heard nothing to lead me to give an opinion as to the cause of the collision. My left hand buffer struck the centre of the buffer beam of the Midland engine. The buffers of my engine were broken, and the buffer beam bent. To the best of my judgement I did not run above four yards after I shut off the steam and applied the Westinghouse break. I was on the left side of the engine and my fireman on the right side.

Frank Osborne, in the Brighton Company’ service, locomotive department, seven years, five years before in the telegraph department, fireman four years and a half. Firing to driver Hoadley, tank engine 262, on Saturday morning last with 7.30 a.m. train, London Bridge to Victoria. We left London Bridge 7.31, as near as I can say, having received the all right starting signal at the end of the platform. I saw that signal myself. I also saw the signal on the girder bridge at the north box, and the signal over A.B. box. These signals were showing clear or right away for our train. When leaving the platform, I looked backed and saw the train was coming all right, and on looking ahead when approaching the signal girder bridge for the north box, I saw a light engine in front of us, say about a hundred yards ahead, but I did not think it was on our line. I cannot say whether that engine was running or standing still, but I should imagine that it was standing still, as I did not notice any steam about, the morning being a misty one; and the lines there being very much curved and crossed, it is almost impossible to tell on which line an engine is standing at that distance. I stepped across the footplate to the driver’s side (the left side) to open the damper, and during that time my mate had caught sight of the engine from his side of the footplate. He immediately shut off the steam and applied the Westinghouse break. We were then about 12 yards from the engine ahead. I should say the engine was standing still when I saw it, and after seeing the engine standing I went over to the driver’s side. My mate and I got off the engine after the collision, and we then saw the Midland engine was in back gear. When our engine came to rest the Midland engine was about three or four yards ahead, caused by the collision. We were going about from six to eight miles per hour, I should think, when we struck the light engine. Our engine stopped dead on striking the Midland engine. When I saw the Midland engine ahead, it did not occur to me that it was foul of the line on which we were running. I was 20 or 30 yards on the London Bridge side of the girder signals when I saw that the Midland engine was in front of us, but I did not know whether it was foul of the line on which we were running or not.

William Barnes, guard in the Brighton Company, seven years’ service, six years as guard. I was guard, riding in the front break of 7.30 a.m. London Bridge to Victoria, via Crystal Palace, train on Saturday, 17th February. We started at 7.32 a.m. Our train consisted of 10 vehicles, including two break carriages with two guards, one at each end of the train. The head porter started us. I saw the starting-signal at the end of the platform off clear for us to go before we started. The next signal I saw was the yard signal over the girder bridge, which was also off,- and the A.B. signals were also off for my train. I saw nothing nor fell anything more till we struck something when we were just past the girder bridge. I got out of my break on the off side and went round the engine of my train to the. other side. I then saw the engine we hail come into collision with ; it was a Midland Company’s engine. The reason I did not see the engine ahead before, was that I was standing at my door looking to the rear of the train to exchange signals with my mate. It was a little misty at the time ; my train was running about 9 to 10 miles per hour when we struck the other engine. I felt the application of the break immediately before the collision took place, The Brighton Company’s engine driver did not whistle; I did not notice any whistle. There had been no diminution of speed when the collision took place. No complaint was made of anyone being hurt in my train, neither passengers nor Company’s servants.Nothing came to my knowledge to give any definite light as to the cause of the collision.

John Frost, yard foreman to the South-Eastern Railway Company, service five years, four years goods foreman London Bridge. I was on duty at thelow level station, London Bridge, on the morning of Saturday, 17th instant. A Midland Company’s train arrived in the low level station about 7.21 or 7.22 a.m., putting the breaks on No. 1 road under the wall on to 12 empty trucks. I let the engine and trucks stand after putting the breaks on No. 1 road, till I looked round the trucks they had brought, to see if any were to go away. Finding none were to go away I got the engine to pull up a few lengths to put the 11 trucks back on No.3 low line. I told the engineman to go up away from London Bridge, over No. 3 points, and back on to his breaks and the empties to go away, which were standing on No. 1 road. I did not say how many empties were going away ; we can only send 18 by one train. The engine came back on to No. 1 line, and I coupled it to the next break, and after coupling the second break to the empties, we started to pull out of the yard. I was riding on the step of the break next tot the truck, and as were we nearing the C.D. box the guard said, “I will uncouple the engine,” and I then dropped off the step to see the empties over No.2 points, and make sure of my low level pilot, then coming in, going clear so as to avoid stopping the Midland engine in running round. So far as I could see from C.D. box the the Midland engine,which had brought the trucks,was just past the disc signal controlling No. 2 low level line, and the tank or bunker part of the engine was on the station side of the disc signal. I saw the Midland engine going ahead, and the signal at A.B. off for a Brighton train to leave that yard. The Midland engine had only stopped long enough to be uncoupled, before going on ahead. 1 whistled with my mouth loudly, and ran up towards the engine to try and stop him,but I could not get the drivers attention. Before 1 could get so far as the engine the Brighton train ran into it. I did not notice the position of the disc controlling No. 2 line at all. There wns no occasion for the Midland driver to pass the disc signal ; he had on 12 trucks and 2 breaks, and 16 trucks can be run round clear. 1 was nearly a length of the train from the disc signal, on the London Bridge side of it, when I alighted from the break step. From the time I gave the signal to start from No. 1 line to pull out of the yard I never gave any signal whatever to the Midland driver. There has been no alteration, or change, or repair, made with the signals. From the time the collision occurred I did not notice the position of the disc signal. I have no reason to suppose the disc was first taken off to allow the Midland engine to pass it and then put on again to allow the Brighton Company s train to leave first. I did not call the Midland engine "Come back, Derby," and I did not hear anyone call out "Come back, Derby."

Henry Smith, in the South-Eastern Company’s service 30 years, signalman something over 20 years, at A.B. signal box 17 years. On Saturday, 17th February, I was on duty at 6.0 a.m. in the A.B. signal box. A Midland Company’s train passed into the low level station at about 7.20 a.m. At 7.32 a.m. I received a signal on the bel from C.D. box that a shunt was wanted to be done from the low level on the down main line to Croydon. I did not answer this signal in any way, as I had received and accepted a signal at 7.31 a.m. for a down Brighton train to Victoria from the London Bridge station. I had, before receiving this shunt signal, taken off the releasing gear in the Brighton Company’s south box. As the Brighton Company’s train was about opposite the north box in the Brighton Company’s yard, I turned my eye in the direction of the goods yard, and saw the Midland engine coming out. I called to my signal lad to give the telegraph block to the south box to warn them of it. I did not take off any signal or locking gear connected with the low level yard for the Midland engine to come out. There is a disc signal working from the A.B. box controlling the line on which the Midland engine ran out on the middle siding line. The disc signal was at the time the engine passed it standing at danger. I cannot take off the low level disc signal after releasing the slotting gear in the south box; this is done by the first lever, No. 20. The second lever, No. 4 lowers the signal over my box, and I had had no occasion to use the low level disc signal to permit any train or engine to come out on to the down main Croydon line since I came on duty at 6 a.m. I have no knowledge of any failure to work of this disc signals for some months past. I tried the signal about 10.0 a.m., after the collision had taken place, the same morning, and it was working well; the locking as between the trailing points from Brighton Company’s yard, and the Brighton Company’s out signals and low level disc signal. I saw the back light of the low level signal, say about half an hour before the collision took place. There was rather a ground mist at 7.32 a.m., and if the gas had been still alight I could have seen it. The locking points, &c. were all in good working order. The Midland engine had stopped dead before the collision took place; it might have been stopped half a minute. I think the engine of the Brighton train was at the girder signals when the Midland engine stopped.  

William Ballard, labourer in the Engineers’ Department, South-Eastern Railway, for 18 years, was on duty in the London Bridge yard on Saturday last. I saw the collision between a light engine and a down Brighton Company’s train. I was about five or six yards off at right angles when it happened. Directly after the collision occurred I walked up to the ground disc signal controlling the low level line, and found it standing at Danger. I do not think anyone could have got to the signal before I did. The signal was in good working order. I did not notice the light in it. I was standing on the Greenwich line side of the Midland engine, opposite to it, and did not hear any one call out Come back Derby. I believe the Midland engine was standing still when the collision occurred. I did not notice the points through which the Midland eugine would have had to run to get round its train. I did not see any other person near the spot where the collision took place.

Henry Hawks, signalman in the South Eastern Company’s service 22 years and 19 years a signalman. I was on duty at C.D. signal box, and at 7.32 I rang out a shunt signal to A.B. signal box, for the Midland engine to run round its train. This was not acknowledged by the A.B. The driver whistled for the disc signal when down in the yard, and drew out towards the disc signal. The driver pulled up I think a little past the disc signal, and stayed about long enough to be uncoupled to be uncoupled; I saw him start away towards A.B. box to the old main line. I could not  do anything to prevent the collision, but I saw the Brighton train going out. At the time the Midland engine was drawing up towards the disc signal it was at danger, of this I am sure. The disc signal had never been turned off from the time I came on duty at 6 a.m. till that time. After the Midland engine had passed the second disc signal, between my box and the A.B. box, I did not shift the trailing points for the engine to run round its train until after the collision.

Arthur Jones, engine drive, in the Midland Company’s service 11 years, and engine driver 16 months, was in charge of engine No. 785 with the 6.20 a.m. London Bridge to Kentish Town empty goods waggon train on Saturday, 17th February. We were late arriving on the outward journey, reaching London Bridge at 7.22 a.m. I backed my train across the road into the low level siding; knocked the breaks on to the empties standing in a left hand siding under the old shed. I then shunted my train off into another siding, and went back with my engine on to my breaks; pushed them back on to the empty wagons, and then received a signal from the yard foreman to blow up and go out with my train to run round it. I understood this to mean I was to blow up and go forward to the disc signal, and wait for it to be taken off if it was not already clear. When I first blew up the disc was at danger, I did not notice any light in it; when approaching I saw it pulled off when about 30 yards from it, at the time my engine passed the disc signal it was clear, showing a green face. I think I had 12 wagons on. In consequence of seeing the disc being turned off I did not stop till my engine and one break had passed. I was then uncoupled, and was told, “Right Derby, go ahead,” by the foreman, I judges he stood against the disc signal the he said this by his voice. I asked my fireman, “Who gave you right?” he said, “The foreman;” on this I started to run round, looked at my road as I ran through it, and saw all my points were right for me right for me; when I got over the top points I saw them pulled over for me to set back. I reversed the gear, and heard some one say, Right Derby, which I suppose came from the signalman in the C.D. box. I saw the points set right for me to set back, of this I am certain. The next thing that happened was the Brighton train dashing into me. As I went towards the A.B. box I did not notice how the signals were over the A.B. box. I think it was 7.29 a.m. after the break-van was disconnected from the engine to enable me to run round my train, mid the collision occurred about three minutes afterwards.

Conclusion.

From the preceding statements it will be seen that on the day in question the London, Brighton, and South Coast Company s 7.30 a.m. down passenger train from London Bridge to Victoria, vid the Crystal Palace, left the station at 7.32 a.m. The train consisted of a tank engine, No. 262, and 10 vehicles, including two break carriages, with two guards. The train was fitted throughout with the Westinghouse automatic break, and it is stated that there was 55 lbs. pressure of air when the break was applied.

The driver states that the starting signal at the end of the platform, the yard signal on the girder bridge over the lines, which is just opposite to the disc signal to which I have referred, and the signal at the A.B. signal-box, were all off for him to go away with his train before he started, when he received the signal from the head porter on No. 4 platform, which is at the side of the line he had been standing on.

There is no contradiction to this evidence. The driver further states that between the girder signal bridge and the A.B. signal-box he ran into a Midland engine on the out road on which he was running : that he was close on the Midland engine, say four yards away, before he saw it, owing to the curve and there being a thick ground mist at the time: that he was on the left-hand side of the engine, in the direction they were running, chimney first, and standing under the cover of the cab: that directly he saw the engine he shut off the steam and applied the Westinghouse automatic air-break : that they stopped almost immediately owing to the action of the air break, and to the best of his belief they were going about six miles an hour when they struck the Midland engine. He also says that his mate, the fireman, said nothing to him, neither did he call his attention in any way before the collision occurred.

The fireman admits haying seen the Midland engine when they were 20 or 30 yards on the London Bridge station side of the girder bridge signals, and this would make the distance to the spot where the collision took place amount to rather more than 100 yards ; but he says that he did not think that the Midland engine was on or foul of the line on which they were running: that the morning was a misty one, and the lines there being very much curved and crossed, it is almost impossible to tell on which line an engine is standing at that distance. He thinks they were running at from six to eight miles an hour when the collision happened. He noticed that the Midland engine was in back gear, and thinks it was standing still.
The guard riding in the front van thinks the speed at the time of the collision was about nine or ten miles an hour.

The Brighton Company s signalman, in what is called their north box, states that he rang the Crystal Palace out train to the south box at 7.30 a.m., and the release stop was removed directly afterwards by the signalman in the south box. This enabled him at once to lower the platform signal for the train to start from No. 4 line : he noticed that the signals at the A.B. box were set at clear for the 7.30 a.m. train, and this was previous to his lowering the starting signal : that he saw nothing obstructing the line for the 7.30 train when he lowered the signal, and nothing unusual occurred till the collision took place about 7.32 or 7.33 a.m.
The Brighton Company s signalman in the south box states that the Crystal Palace train was signalled to him from the north box at 7.30 a.m., and he immediately gave it on to the South-Eastern Company’s A.B. box, and the A.B. signalman lowered his electric semaphore signal and released the trailing points (moved by lever 50), which normally stand right for the South-Eastern line to or from the low level goods station.

This enabled him to shift the points and to pull off his slotting gear at the north box : that everything was all right, and the signals off for the Brighton Company’s train to leave the station, and it started and came out all right till nearly abreast of his box, but had not quite reached his box when lie saw a Midland Company’s engine run out from the low level goods station on to the down line in front of the Brighton Company’s train ; that he was standing in the middle of the locking frame and saw the train about a carriage length in the rear of the engine, which had then stopped, but the Midland engine had not been at a stand half a second before the collision occurred.
The South-Eastern Company’s signalman in the A.B. box states that a Midland Company’s goods train passed into the low level station at about 7.20 a.m., and at 7.32 a.m. he received a signal on the bell from the signalman in the Company’s C.D. box that a shunt was wanted to be done from the low level goods station on to the down main line to Croydon. He says he did not answer this bell signal in any way, as he had received and had accepted at 7.31 a.m. a signal for a down train to Victoria from the Brighton London Bridge station : that he had, before receiving the shunt signal, taken off the releasing gear in the Brighton Company’s south box, and, as the Brighton Company’s train was about opposite to the north box in the Brighton Company’s yard, he saw a Midland engine coming out of the goods yard : that he called to the signal lad to give the telegraph block to the south box to warn them of it : that he did not take off any signal or locking gear connected with the low level yard for the Midland engine to come out, and the disc signal for controlling the line on which the Midland engine ran out on the middle siding line was, at the time the engine passed it, standing at Danger : that he could not take off the low level disc signal after releasing the slotting gear in the south box: this is done by the first lever, No. 20 ; the second lever, No. 4, lowers the signal over his box, and he had had no occasion to use the low level disc signal to permit any train or engine to come out on to the down main line to Croydon after he came on duty at 6.0 a.m. : that he had no knowledge of any failure to work of this disc signal for some months past, and he tried this signal about 10 a.m. the same morning after the collision had taken place, and it was working well, and he says that the Midland engine had stopped, it might have been half a minute, before the collision took place. He thinks the engine of the Brighton train was at the girder bridge signals when the Midland engine stopped. The distance between the girder bridge signals and the spot where the collision occurred is about 85 yards. 

The South-Eastern Company s signalman in the C.D. box states that at 7.32 a.m. he rang out a shunt signal to the A.B. box for the Midland engine to run round its train. This was not acknowledged by A.B. : that the driver (of the Midland engine) whistled for the disc signal when down in the yard, and drew out towards the disc signal, and pulled up, he thinks, a little past the disc signal, and stayed about long enough to be uncoupled : that he saw him start away to the old main line : that he could not do anything to prevent the collision with the Brighton train going out : that at the time the Midland engine was drawing up towards the disc signal it was at Banger, of that he was sure: that the disc signal had never been turned off from the time he came on duty at 6 a.m. till that time: that after the Midland engine had passed the second disc signal between his box and the A.B. box he did not shift the trailing points for the engine to run round its train until after the collision had taken place.

So far the evidence is clear and distinct that this disc signal was never turned off
for the Midland engine to come out on to the main down line.

The driver of the Midland engine states that they were late in reaching London Bridge
station with the 6.20 a.m. Kentish Town empty goods train in arriving at 7.22 a.m.: that he backed his train across the road into the low level siding: knocked the breaks on to the empties standing in a left-hand siding under the old shed : that he then shunted his train off into another siding, and went back with his engine on to his breaks, pushed them back on to the empty waggons, and then received a signal from the yard foreman to blow up and go out with his train to run round it : that he under¬ stood this to mean that he was to blow up and go forward to the disc signal, and wait for it to be taken off if it was not already clear. When he first blew up the disc signal was at Danger, but he did not notice any light in it, and when approaching it he saw it pulled off when about 30 yards from it : that at the time his engine passed the disc signal it was at Clear, showing a green face: he thinks he had. about 12 waggons on : that in consequence of seeing the disc being turned off he did not stop till his engine and one break had passed: he was then uncoupled, and was told, Right Derby, go ahead, by the yard foreman : that he judged that he stood against the disc signal when he said this ( by his voice) : that he asked his fireman, Who gave you right? he said, The foreman,” and on this he started to run round, looked at his road as he ran through it, and saw all his points were right for him : when he got over the top points he saw them pulled over for him to set back : he reversed the gear, and heard some one say, Right, Derby,” which, he supposes, came from the signalman in the C.D. box ; that he is certain that he saw the points set right for him to set back, and the next thing that happened was the Brighton driver did so, and drew up towards the disc signal : that he saw this signal when they were approaching it, and it was a green light : that he had when they were down by the water crane seen this signal showing a red light : that the driver passed this signal by the engine and break and then stopped to uncouple the engine from the break : that the under guard uncoupled, and then some one said, Right out Derby ” : that he saw the South-Eastern foreman then standing near the second break, but he could not say if it was the yard foreman who said, Right out Derby : that he thought at the time that it was the South-Eastern foreman who gave them the Right out : that the driver started at once, and they went over and clear of the trailing points and looked back and at tbe same time some one said, Right back Derby : that he saw the points had been shifted to the necessary position to run round the train, and the driver had just reversed the gear of his engine when the Brighton Company's engine ran into their engine.

Neither of the guards with the Midland goods train were prepared to say how the disc signal stood when the Midland engine passed over it, but there is no doubt that there was no light in this signal at the time when the Midland engine came out of the goods yard.
train dashing into him.

The Midland fireman states that the yard foreman told the driver to blow up, and the
The evidence is very contradictory between two of the servants of the Midland Company, and that of the driver and fireman and the servants of the other two companies, but, in my opinion, there is no question as to which is correct.

I have no doubt that the driver of the Midland train ran past the disc signal whilst it was standing at danger.

Three causes have combined to permit this collision to occur, viz.:

1. A faulty construction of the South-Eastern Company’s goods yard at London Bridge low level station in the absence of catch points, &c., to prevent an engine from running out on to the down main passenger line when the signals arc against it.

2. The absence of a proper look out on the part of the driver of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company s 7.30 a.m. down passenger train, as he was passing under the girder bridge signals, when there would have been ample distance for a train, fitted throughout with the Westinghouse continuous breaks, to have been pulled up before it reached the Midland engine. The driver, in fact, does not appear to have been on the look out at all until his engine was close to the Midland engine.

3. The misconduct of the engine-driver of the Midland engine in having passed out on to the main down line, apparently passing the disc-signal at danger, which should not have been passed at danger,” and further running on until foul of the main down line when there was a signal off over the A.B. box, 100 yards in front of him, for a train to come out from the Brighton station.

It is most fortunate that the consequence were not more serious.