
The collision that occurred on the 29th January last, at the Victoria station, on the London Brighton and South Coast Railway. In this case, the engine of the 5.35 p.m. passenger train from the Victoria station for West Croydon, came into collision, in a dense fog, after the train had started from its proper line at that (Victoria) station, with the engine of an empty carriage train which was being drawn into the station in the opposite direction on the same line. The buffer-beams of the two engines which thus came together were damaged ;but the damage to the rolling-stock was otherwise inconsiderable.
Up to the present time 21 passengers have com- plained of injury.
Description.
The only portion of the Victoria station that need be referred to in the present case is that on the local, or western side. It was on the westernmost line on that side of the station, and at 60 yards from the end of the platform, that this collision occurred.
There are three signal-cabins which it will be necessary to refer to, viz.: the Eccleston-Bridge cabin, at 32 yards from the point of collision; the Victoria-junction cabin, 150 yards outside the Eccleston-Bridge cabin ; and the Victoria-siding cabin, 150 yards beyond the Victoria-junction cabin.
The Victoria-siding cabin is provided with levers for working points and a signal, which are not inter-locked with one another, it being the duty of the signalman in that cabin simply to work the points in the west sidings, and the signal outside his cabin,
as well as certain discs in the Victoria-junction cabin, for admitting engines and trains to and from the sidings south of his cabin, and for allowing them to proceed towards the Victoria junction when it is necessary to occupy the piece of line between his cabin and the junction-cabin for shunting purposes. The Victoria-junction cabin is provided with levers for working the points and signals for engines and trains proceeding into or out of the station. Com- munication by mechanical-discs is maintained between this signalman and the Victoria-siding-cabin signal- man. The Eceleston-Bridge cabin is provided with levers for working points and signals, for controlling the whole work of the station and the various lines in and out of it. The signalman in this last cabin works with the signalman in the Victoria-junction cabin, by means of electrical bells for shunting purposes, and for empty trains entering the station ; hut by means of mechanical-discs for passenger-trains leaving the station and arriving at it.
The signal to be principally referred to, for the admission of trains from the Victoria-junction cabin towards the station, is attached to a girder 40 yards on the south of that cabin. This is called the siding- girder-signal ; and us regards trains starting from the westernmost local line at the station, there is a semaphore starting-signal at the end of the platform, and there is a signal called the "section-girder-signal," 180 yards further from the starting-signal, worked from the Victoria junction cabin; but the platform- starting-signal is worked from the Eccleston-Bridge cabin. The platform-starting-signal worked from the Eceleston-Bridge cabin, and the siding-girder-signal for admitting trains to the station, may be taken off at the same moment.
Evidence.
The passenger-train in question consisted of a tank- engine and eight vehicles, including two break-carriages, one at each end of the train. It started from the Victoria station at 5.37 p.m. two minutes late.
The engine-driver, William Saunders, received a signal to start from the inspector in the usual way, and saw the starting signal lowered. He had gone about 20 or 30 yards, when ho heard some one call out to him, "Hold on." He at once shut off steam and reversed the engine, and called to his fireman to apply his break ; and while he was doing so, he. saw an engine coming in the opposite direction in a very thick fog. He could not see this engine for more than two or three yards before it struck his engine. His engine remained on the rails.
The fireman, Samuel Allison, also heard some one calling out, and began to apply the break, and had got it partly on when the collision occurred.
The guard, William Grover, after closing the doors of the carriages, was standing near the third carriage from the engine when the inspector gave him the signal to start. He had got into his van, and closed the door of it, and was looking at his watch, when he suddenly, without any warning, felt the shock of the collision. He was thrown first against the front and then against the back of his van, but was not hurt.
The empty-carriage-train, drawn. by a tank-engine, left the sidings at about 5.37 p.m., according to the evidence of the engine-driver, William Schofield, who did not, however, look at his watch, and cannot be certain as to the exact time. He received permission verbally from the signalman at the Victoria-siding cabin to leave the siding for the purpose of running into the station, but he could not tell on which line, as it depended upon the signalman in the Eccleston- Bridge cabin to turn him into whichever line was vacant. He found the girder-signal south of the junction-cabin clear for him to run into the station. After passing the Eccleston-Bridge cabin he heard someone shout, and saw the 5.3.5 p.in. passenger- train leaving the station. He could not see that engine or the steam from it for more than a dozen yards before he struck it. His train was almost at a stand, or was not, at all events, going at a greater speed than a mile an hour.
The fireman, William Chadwell, confirms in all respects the statement of his engine-driver.
John Lawrence, the engine-driver of a light engine which preceded the empty-carriage-train into the station, states, that he left the sidings—but cannot say exactly at what time with the permission of the signalman in the Victoria-siding-cabin, who showed him a green light, to allow him to run forward towards the station. He found the siding-girder-signal at "danger," but it was lowered as he approached it., and he thus received permission to run forward towards the station. He accordingly proceeded to the turntable, which is connected by a short piece of line with the westernmost-local-line. He brought his engine to a stand partly on the turntable, and he had begun to take water from the water-crane, but he was not probably more than two minutes in that position before he saw the empty- carriage-train approaching the station. Immediately afterwards he saw the passenger-train coming out of the station, and, noticing that a collision was inevitable, he shouted out "Stop, Bill " to the driver of the empty-carriage-train; but the name applied to the two engine-drivers, as they were both named "Bill."
The fireman of the light-engine, Henry Stedman, is unable to add to the evidence of Ids engine-driver, which is quite correct.
James Stewart, the signalman on duty in the Victoria-siding-cabin, at half-past five, or it
have been a little later, showed a green light to the engine-driver, Lawrence, of the light-engine, to allow him to go to the turntable in the station. He addressed to Lawrence some words of caution at the same moment ; but he is not sure whether Lawrence heard him. About 5.35 he gave a white light from his hand lamp to Schofield, the engine-driver of the empty-carriage-train, to allow him also to proceed into the station. Before allowing Lawrence to pass him, and with a minute of his doing so, he pulled over his local line lever, to ask permission from the junction signalman to let the engine pass into the station. After the light engine had passed his cabin, he put back his local line lever, and he brought it forward a second time to give notice to the junction cabin of the empty-passenger-train, before that train passed his (siding) cabin, He always gives a separate signal for every engine or train that passes his cabin ;. but he does not take care to get "clear" on the disc provided for the purpose before allowing au engine or train to pass his cabin. He did not get " clear" on the disc in his cabin from the junction-cabin for the light engine ; but he did get "clear " for the passenger-train.
Joseph Jury, the signalman on duty in the Victoria junction-cabin, states, as nearly as he can, that about 5.33 he saw the disc turned over in his cabin, indicating " empties waiting." He signalled forward to the Eceleston-Bridge cabin to the same effect by means of a telegraph-bell. He did not receive a reply from the Eeeleston-Bridge cabin for several minutes. When he at length received permission from the Eecleston-Bridge cabin for the admission of the empties into the station, he gave back " clear " to the Victoria-siding-cabin, and prepared his road for the A (loud) section at the station. Thinking that the empties were a long time coming, he saw the yard-foreman, who said they were just coming. Not knowing what line the empties were going to be turned into, he had, two minutes previously, given leave for the 5.35 p.m. West-Croydon train to leave the station, and he heard afterwards of the collision. He saw nothing of the light-engine, and it was as much as ho could do to sec the empty train passing his cabin in the fog.
John Arnold, the signalman on duty in the Eccleston Bridge cabin, states that at 5.34 or 5.35 he received five beats on his telegraph bell from the junction cabin, which meant that thee was either an engine or an empty carriage train waiting to pass into Section A at the station. He gave five beats back, which meant to let engine or empties come into station, He saw an engine pass his cabin. It was an understood thing between him and the yard foreman that the engine was to come before the empty carriage train, and he therefore turned the engine properly on to the engine turntable. He always knows whether an engine or a carriage train is coming, otherwise he might make a mistake, and turn them in the wrong direction; and it is especially necessary that he should be acquainted in foggy weather what is going on. At 5.36 he pulled over the lever working a disc in the junction cabin for a passenger train to come out. The disc was pulled over in hid cabin from the junction cabin to allow the passenger train to go out, and he therefore pulled of the starting signal to allow the train to start; but he received no notice of the empty carriage train approaching the station.
Conclusion
In the case of this collision then, the 5.35 p.m. passenger-train was being started from the local side of the Victoria station at the same time that an empty-passenger-train was being admitted on the same line at that side of the station ; and the mistake under which the one train was being started in one direction, and the other train Was being admitted in the opposite direction on the same line at the same time appears to have occurred as follows:—
The signalman in the Victoria-siding-cabin states that he gave notice to the signalman in the Victoria- junction-cabin, first of the light-engine, and secondly of the empty-carriage-train. He admits that he (lid not get " clear " for the light-engine to go in before he gave the second notice for the empty-carriage- train, whilst the signalman in the junction cabin asserts that he only received one notice, which he understood to mean that the empty-carriage-train was about to proceed into the station, and that he was not aware of the light-engine running into the station at all. The signalman in the junction-cabin, by means of his telegraph-bell, accordingly signalled forward five beats, which he intended for an empty-carriage-train only. He did not know what line they would be turned into, and he had, two minutes previously, given leave for the 5.35 p.m. passenger-train to leave the station. The signalman in the Eccleston-Bridge-cabin, having received five beats on his telegraph-bell, which lie understood to apply to the light-engine, allowed the engine to run forward to the turntable ; and he was not aware of the approach of the empty-carriage-train, when, after pulling over his mechanical-disc to the junction- cabin, and having received permission by a similar disc worked from that cabin, he lowered the starting- signal, and allowed the passenger-train to start.
It is clearly desirable, in order to avoid such mistakes, that the signalman in the siding-cabin should give notice, and receive permission, separately for every train or engine that passes his cabin to proceed into the station, and that the points and signals should be so interlocked that it shall be impossible for the signalmen to combine in lowering conflicting signals, and in setting the points, so as to allow of two trains, the one entering and the other starting from the station on the same line of rails at the same time. But the most important question involved in this collision, is that of providing further accommodation, which is much required, for carrying on the necessary traffic in and out of the Victoria station, for the shunting operations now unavailable performed on the passenger lines at entrance to the station; and this is a question which the Directors of the Company would do well to make this opportunity of seriously considering.