HASTINGS
22nd FEBRUARY 1892
INVOLVING BRIGHTON DRIVER FRANK ILLMAN AND HIS FIREMAN
THOMAS GODDEN
EXTRACTED AND ADAPTED FROM THE REPORT BY
C.S. HUTCHINSON
MAJOR GENERAL, R.E.
A collision which occurred on the 22nd ultimo at Hastings station on the South Eastern Railway.
In this case the London, Brighton, and South Coast Company's 7.55 a.m. passenger train from Brighton to Hastings, where it was due at 9.37 a.m., overran the home signals, which were at danger against it, and about 50 yards inside those signals came into collision with a South Eastern Company's engine which had been on its way to a siding covered by the signals, but had just been stopped, when its driver perceived that the passenger train was running in too fast to stop at the home signals.
Nine passengers are reported to have been injured, but none of the injuries are believed to be serious.
The Brighton Company's train consisted of a six-wheeled engine (with the four front wheels coupled) and tender, running engine in front, and seven vehicles, with a guard in each of the front and rear ones, fitted throughout with the Westinghouse brake.
The South·Eastern Company's engine was a tender-engine running engine in front fitted with the automatic vacuum brake.
A list of damage is given· in an appendix. No wheels were knocked off the rails.
Description.
Hastings station, which is partly a terminal and partly a through station, is approached from St. Leonards (Warrior Square) station, distant from Hastings about 1,250 yards, through a tunnel 783 yards long, commencing near to the west end of Warrior Square station, and terminating about quarter of a mile from the buffer stops at the end of the dock platform lines at Hastings station; the line through the tunnel and up to the west end, of the Hastings platform is straight, the gradients being as fo1lows, commencing at the -west end of Warrior Square station : -
880 yards, falling 1 in 100
110 yards, rising 1 in 264
214 yards, rising in 248
The signal cabin for the west end of Hastings station is situated on the south or up side of the main line, about 200 yards east-of the tunnel mouth, and the signals referring to the down main line consist of a distant signal (a disc in the tunnel in-the 6ft. space) 465 yards from -the cabin, and a group of four home signals on the south or up side of the main lines, 153 yards east of the tunnel mouth or 418 yards from the distant signal. These home signals were originally visible at least from the tunnel mouth, but two or three years ago an arched over bridge was constructed 20 yards to the west of them, i.e., between them and the tunnel mouth, thus reducing the distance at which No. 5 home signal leading· to the platform line to which, the Brighton train was intended to go can be seen to about 75 yards, under the most favourable circumstances.
The Brighton Company's train was intended to run to one of the dock line platforms, to do which it had to cross from the down to the up line through a cross over road with facing-points those on the down line being close to the home signals.
The South-Eastern Company's engine was proceeding from the main platform line, where it had just arrived With a train from Ashford, through a cross-over road leading, with facing points, from the up to the down line and thence to a siding joining the down line with trailing points 54 yards inside the down home signals. The points of this cross over road and siding were set right for the engine, which was upon them when the collision occurred, and through faulty interlocking arrangements owing to which the cross-over roads remained interlocked when the siding points had been set for the siding the signalman was unable to make the facing points of the west cross-over road right for the Brighton Company's train and to turn it through them, whereby the collision which took place at 9.37 a.m., 50 yards inside the home~signals, would -h_ave been prevented.
The line between St. Leonards and Hastings is worked upon the absolute block system as regards trains following each other between St. Leonards and the down home signals at Hastings, but notwithstanding, 1st, the difficulty of seeing the distant signal (a disc in the tunnel), 2nd, the bad view of the home-signals owing to the recent erection of the over-bridge which now limits it to about 75 yards, and, 3rd, the descending gradient of l in 100 which extends for half-a-mile from St. Leonards to within about 100 yards of the home signals, the signalman is allowed to accept a train on the down line from St. Leonards when shunting is taking place on this down line close up to the down home-signals.
Evidence.
Thomas William Ludlow, signalman: I have been 14 year's in tho South-Eastern Company's service, 13 year's signalman, and 1 year 11 months in the Hastings junction box, where I came on duty at 5,15 a.m. on the 22nd February to remain till 2 p.m. I have a signal lad to assist me, who was with me when the collision occurred. I work the absolute block system between my box and St. Leonards Warrior Square; but I am allowed by my
rules to accept a train from Warrior Square when shunting is taking place inside my home signals. The down distant-signal in the tunnel is a free signal not interlocked with any points, not even with those leading from the down road to the up road near the tunnel mouth. I accepted the 7.55 a.m. train from Brighton at 9.32 a.m.; it was running about punctual. I lowered no signals for it, because at the time shunting was going on upon tho up main line in making up the 10.25 a.m. up train for Brighton. I intended to keep the down train at the home-signals until I could allow it to run into the station, when I meant to give it a hand-signal to run in on the road to which the right hand top signal refers. I did not intend to drop the home-signal, because there were coaches standing on the road at the end of the platform to which the Brighton train would run. The South Eastern Company's engine with which the Brighton train collided, had been standing on the down line at the platform. I set the points and lowered the disc signal for it to cross from the down line to the siding to do some shunting. The Brighton train at this time, about 9.34 a.m., must have been in the tunnel. When the South-Eastern engine was about half-way through the crossing, I saw the Brighton train coming out of the tunnel; my attention was called to it by the signal-lad holding up his arms to stop it, and there was a shunter outside the box also doing the same, both of them thinking the train was coming too fast. I went to the window and put my arms up and tried to stop the train. The South Eastern engine had stopped, but there was no time for it to move back before the collision occurred. The speed of the Brighton train was I think from 10 to 15 miles an hour when it struck the South Eastern engine, which I am quite sure was stationary at the time. The Brighton train stopped dead on the collision occurring. I think the engines struck buffer to buffer. I heard no whistling from either engine before the collision took place. I did not notice whether the Brighton Company's driver had shut off steam, or whether he applied his brake. If the line had been clear the Brighton train would have been let in by the lowering of No. 5 signal. I work the cross over road near the tunnel mouth, and this operation is protected only by the block at St. Leonard's station, and by the distant signal which is not interlocked with the cross over road. I am quite sure I was not transgressing any rule in allowing the South Eastern engine to pass from the down road into the siding after I had given "line clear" to St. Leonards; the nature of the traffic will not allow any other mode of working being adopted. The South Eastern engine was not absolutely required for about an hour after the collision occurred. It was necessary to stop the Brighton train at the signal to get the engine into the siding. A Brighton Company's light engine had passed through the tunnel on the down road about 10 minutes before the collision, and the down road about 10 minutes before the collision, and the previous train on the up road was the London, Brighton, and South Coast Company's train leaving Hastings at 9.10 a.m. for Brighton. It was morning, but the rails were a little damp from mist.
Alfred Scot, shunter; I have been 10 years in the South Eastern Company's service, and three years at Hastings. I began work on the 22nd February at 8 a.m. for 12 hours duty. When the Brighton Company's train was approaching the station I was at the St. Leonards end of the platform, and I walked down to the signal cabin to tell the signalman where I wanted the South-Eastern Company's engine, which was afterwards in collision, to go. I wanted the engine to pass from the platform to the down main line and into the School Board siding. to do some· shunting. The points had been set for the South Eastern engine. I was standing in front of the box, between the down and up roads, when I saw the Brighton train coming out of the tunnel. At this time the South-Eastern engine had left the platform and was coming through the crossing. Directly I saw the Brighton train coming out of the tunnel I thought its speed was too great for it to stop at the signals. I at once stopped the South-Eastern engine, which had got a short distance beyond the School Board siding points. I held up my arms and shouted to the driver of the Brighton train. The speed of the Brighton train was from 16 to 20 miles an hour. I cannot say when the continuous brake was applied but just before the collision I saw all the wheels on the train skidding. There was no steam on the engine when it issued from the tunnel. The South-Eastern engine had just come to a stand when the collision took place. I do not think the force of the collision moved back the South-Eastern engine more than· half a foot. It took the South-Eastern engine all its time to stop where it did while the Brighton train was running from the tunnel. None of the men on the engines jumped off before the collision. No wheels were off the rails. I believe the buffers of both engines met. The South-Eastern engine had some shunting to do before it joined its, train at 10.42, and I could not afford to allow it to wait until the Brighton train had arrived. The Brighton train would have had to stop at the home signals to have allowed the South-Eastern engine to get back along the straight road.
3. John Osborne, signal-lad, stated : I have been two years in the South-Eastern Company's service, and signal lad al1 that time. I came on duty on the 22nd February at 8.30 a.m., to remain till about 7 p.m. I book the trains and attend to the speaking telegraph. When I first saw the Brighton train it was coming out of the tunnel, and I was afraid it was coming too fast. I went outside on the landing and put up my arms and shouted, and attracted the attention of shunter Scott, who was standing on the ground in front of the box, and he also put up his arms and shouted. When the Brighton train came out of the tunnel the South-Eastern engine was half through the crossing, between the platform and the down line, and shunter Scott held up his arms to the South-Eastern driver. The South-Eastern engine had got on to the School Board siding-points, and had just stopped when the engine of the Brighton train struck it. Both engines stopped dead, and remained together. I cannot say at what speed the Brighton train was travelling, but I should think I could run as fast as it was going when it struck the South-Eastern engine.
George Martin, driver, stated : I have been in the South Eastern Company's service 16 years, and driver six years. I commenced duty on the 22nd February at 6 a.m., to sign off at 2 30 p.m. I was working No. 149 tender engine. I had arrived at Hastings at about 9.36 a.m. with a train from Ashford, and immediately after arriving the engine was unhooked from the train. I received instructions from shunter Scott to proceed across to the down road and then along it to pick up a van. I accordingly whistled for the disc signal which was given me, and I passed through the crossing towards the down road running engine first. I had got about three parts of tho way through the cross over road when I saw the Brighton train coming out of the tunnel. I did not notice the speed. The next thing I heard was shunter Scott shouting, and my mate turned round and said, "Whoa!" "Whoa!" I then looked round on the right side, and saw the Brighton train coming too fast to stop. I immediately applied the automatic brake, and stopped the engine just as the leading wheels were on the tip of the points leading to the School Board siding. My engine had just come to a standstill when the Brighton engine struck it. I had got the engine reversed and steam on, but had not time to release the brake before the collision occurred. I could not say what the speed of the Brighton train was. Mt engine was not knocked back more than half a yard owing to my brake being on. The engines met obliquely, buffer to buffer, and remained together buffer locked. None of the wheels of either engine were knocked off the road. Neither I nor my mate was hurst, nor did we jump off. The brake applies to the four coupled wheels of the eight wheels of the engine, and to the six tender-wheels.
William Harrod, fireman : I have been nine years in the South-Eastern Company's service, 3 1/2 years fireman. I was driver Martin's mate only for that day, 22nd February, when my hours would be the same as his. I agree with the driver's evidence as read over to me.
Frank Illmann, driver: I have been in the Brighton Company's service 40 years, and driver 30 years. I commenced work on the 22nd February at 7.55 a.m. to sign off at 8.45 p.m. I should be standing at Hastings from 9.37 a.m. till 11.45 a.m, and again at London Bridge from 2.10 p.m. until 5.15 p.m., during which times I have to coal and water the engine. I was driving engine No. 199, which I have had for the last. five years it is a large tender-engine, four wheels coupled in front, with small trailing wheels, and a six-wheel tender. My place is on the left-hand side of the engine. I had the Westinghouse brake applying to the coupled wheels of the engine, and the tender wheels and to the wheels of all the vehicles of the train. My fireman is Thomas Godden who has been with me about four years; his hours of duty were the same as mine. I was driver of the 7.55 a.m. train from Brighton to Hastings which consisted of 10 vehicles, as far as Polegate, at which station three were detached, and I proceeded- with the remaining seven to Hastings. After leaving Polegate I stopped at Pevensey, Bexhill, St. Leonards West Marina, and St. Leonards Warrior Square, The brake acted properly at all these stops, the pressure in the train being about 50 lbs., and on the engine about 75 lbs. I was keeping time on the journey, and arrived at St. Leonards Warrior Square at 9.33 a.m., and left at 9.35. The first signal is the down distant signal from Hastings, which is a ground signal in the six-ft. of the tunnel. The tunnel was so thick with Steam and fog that I did not see the distant signal. I looked for the signal myself. Not seeing the signal I did not slack the train. I was not going very fast having shut off steam after entering the tunnel about 30 yards from the St. Leonards end the falling gradient commencing about 30 yards from the tunnel mouth. I did not realise where I was until I came to the Hastings end of the tunnel, where I at once applied the Westinghouse brake, using about 25 pounds of air. I think the speed, on coming out of the tunnel, was about 10 miles an hour, and, applying the Westinghouse brake, reduced, it to about four miles an hour at the bridge, and to about three miles when the collision occurred. The rails were in a bad state for stopping, the wheels having picked up when I applied the brake. I pulled the reversing lever over, but did not release the brake or give the engine steam. As soon as I got out of the tunnel I saw the South-Eastern Company's engine, and thinking it was coming along on the down road towards the tunnel mouth, I was much alarmed. I gave the sharp brake whistle two or three times before the collision. I think the South- Eastern engine was still coming towards me when I struck it. I did not drive it back. I think the left buffer of my engine struck the buffer beam of the South-Eastern engine just inside the right buffer of the latter. Neither l nor my fireman Jumped off before the collision. I was struck, in the eye by the regulator handle, but have not had to go on the sick list. The rule for approaching. Hastings station is at such a speed as will allow of the train being stopped at the platform by the hand brakes. I do not think it would have made any difference in what I did had what I did had I seen the distant-signal in the tunnel. I attribute the accident entirely to the state of the rails. Had I seen the home signal sooner I might have reversed the engine. The fireman opened the sand box at the back of the tender directly we got of the tunnel. The front sand box is not of much use unless the train is running. with steam on, as the sand is blown out by steam pressure.
Thomas Godden, fireman:I have been in the service of the Brighton Company 15 years, 11 3/4, years fireman. I have been four years fireman to driver Illmann, and was with him on the 22nd. February, when my hours were the same as his. My place is on the 6-foot side of the engine when running engine first. The Westinghouse-brake acted properly at all the stops up to and including St. Leonards Warrior Square. After leaving it steam was shut off about half way through the tunnel. I cannot say what the speed was when steam was shut oft. I was looking out for the distant signal, but did not see it, the tunnel being so full of smoke and steam. We got to the Hastings end of the tunnel before we expected. Soon after getting out of the tunnel I saw all four signals at danger; this was before I saw the engine. The Westing-house brake was applied directly we got sight of the signals at danger, and the speed considerably reduced. I think I could gave run as fast as the train was going. I should say the speed was about four mies an hour at the home signal. I had applied my hand brake in the tunnel directly after the driver had shut off steam. When we struck the South Eastern engine we were almost at a standstill. I believe the engines met buffer to buffer, although not quite square neither I nor the driver jumped off. I was slightly hurt in the chest.
William Newnham, guard : I have been seven years in the service of the Brighton Company, 3 1/2 years as guard. I commenced work on the 22nd February at 7.55 a.m., to sign off at 7.6 p.m. I was rear guard of the 7.55 a.m. train from Brighton to Hastings. I am not certain as to the composition of the train, as the head guard attends to that. I think we had about seven vehicles on when we left Polegate, after which I was at the rear of the train.The stops were made between Polegate and St. Leonards Warrior Square. I think we left the latter station at right time. I was looking out for signals after leaving St. Leonards, but I did not see the distant signal in the tunnel, owing to the steam and smoke. I believe steam was shut off soon after we came into the tunnel. I think the speed was about four or five miles an hours coming out of the Hastings end of the tunnel. I believe the brake was applied by the driver some distance before we got out of the tunnel, and the speed was somewhat reduced when the collision occurred. I think I heard some whistling just before the collision. I believe it came from the South Eastern engine. I was not aware there was likely to be collusion until within a very few yards of the South Eastern engine. I did not see the home signals. IU put my had brake on a little just before the Westinghouse brake was applied. I felt the collision very slightly in the brake van in the rear of the train, in which I was riding. The front guard of the train was also riding in a brake van. I am not aware that the front guard was hurt. The collision occurred about 9.37 a.m.
Conclusion.
The immediate cause of this collision was want of care on the part of Illmann, an experienced driver in the Brighton Company's service, when approaching Hastings station; he was perfectly well acquainted with the line between St. Leonards (Warrior Square) and Hastings stations, and with the nature of the signal and shunting arrangements at Hastings station. He was driving a large tender-engine, running chimney in front, with the Westinghouse brake applying to the four coupled wheels of the engine, to the tender wheels, and to four wheels of each of the seven vehicles of which the train was composed, the brake having acted well at all the previous stops up to and including St. Leonards Warrior Square. lllmann states, that he shut off steam about 30 yards after entering the tunnel, but failing to see the down distant signal in the tunnel owing to steam and fog, though he looked for it himself, he did not realise where he was until he came to the Hastings end of the tunnel, when his speed did not, he thinks, exceed 10 miles an hour. On finding out where he was, and seeing the South-Eastern Company's engine coming along the down line towards the tunnel, he was much alarmed, and at once applied the Westinghouse brake, gave the brake whistle, reversed his engine (without giving it steam), thus reducing the speed to four miles an hour at the over-bridge (70 yards from tho point of collision) and to three miles an hour on collision. Illmann says the rails were greasy and that the engine wheels skidded when- he applied his brake.
It is hard to understand how Illmann can have so completely mistaken his position, as he must have done upon this occasion, for he must evidently have been running at a far higher rate of speed than the 10 miles an hour he acknowledges on emerging from the tunnel, or have been keeping a very bad look out when he did so otherwise in the distance of 200 yards between the tunnel mouth and the point of collision, of which 200 yards 150 yards were on rising gradients of 1 in 264 and l in 248, the train could have been stopped dead, with the ample brake power Illmann had at his disposal, long before it reached the South-Eastern Company's engine when the speed was still considerable.
Illmann is an experienced driver of 30 years' service as such. He had commenced his-day's work of about 13 hours (during five of which he is not ·working trains, but has only to attend to his engine) about 1 3/4 hours before the collision.
Godden, Illmann's fireman, says that he applied the tender hand-brake when Illmann shut off steam about half way through the_tunnel~·that he failed to see the distant signal in the tunnel owing to steam and. smoke, and got to the Hastings end of the tunnel sooner than he expected; that the Westinghouse brake was applied when the home signals were seen to be at danger (i.e.125yards from the point of collision) when the speed was as fast as he could run, that it was reduced to about four miles an hour on passing the home signal post (75 yards further on), ·and that the train was almost stopped when the collision occurred.
Godden is an experienced fireman of 11 3/4 years' service, his hours having been the same as Illmann's on the 22nd ultimo. He must share, although in a lesser degree, the blame attaching to his driver.
The front guard in charge of the train was on the sick list when I held the inquiry.
The rear guard, Newnham, who says he was looking out for the Hastings distant signal failed to see it owing to the tunnel being full of steam and smoke. He states that he slightly applied his hand-brake before the driver put on the Westinghouse brake, some distance before emerging from the tunnel, and that he was not aware that a collision was imminent until just before it occurred. Understated as the speed must have been by Illmann and Godden, Newnham made the absurd statement that it did not exceed four or five miles an hour when the train emerged from the tunnel, 200 yards from the point of collision, after which it was somewhat reduced.
Newnham has been 3 l/2 yards a guard, had come on duty at 7.55 a.m. for about 11 1/4 hours, and bad therefore been at work nearly two hours when the collision occurred.
There is no blame to be attached to the driver and fireman of the South-Eastern engine who were acting under the instructions of shunter Scott and signalman Ludlow. The engine was going forward up the down line towards the School Board siding when a shout was given to stop, upon which, by the application of the vacuum-brake, the engine was brought to a dead stand with its leading wheels (it had been running chimney in front), just on the siding points when the Brighton engine struck it, and drove it back about half a yard. Neither driver nor fireman jumped off before the collision, nor was either of them hurt.
It was certainly, to say the least of it, injudicious of both shunter Scott und signalman Ludlow to allow the South-Eastern engine to proceed up the down road to go into the School Board siding at the very time (9.34 a..m.) when the Brighton down train, which had left St. Leonard's about a minute previously, and was due at Hastings at 9.35 a.m., was close at hand; they were depending upon the fact that the distant and home-signals were at danger to stop tho Brighton train, and as the rules under which the station is worked permit of shunting taking place on the down line who-a a train had been accepted on that line from St. Leonards, they were not transgressing any rule in acting as they did; but as there were no special need for tho South-Eastern engine (which had just arrived from Ashford), being so promptly sent forward to shunt it would have certainly been only prudent to have detained it, at the most two minutes, until the Brighton train had arrived.
Shunter Scott has been 10 years in the service, and three years shunter at Hastings. He had been on duty about 1 1/2 hours at the time of the collision, having signed on at 8 a.m. to remain till 8 p.m.
Signalman Ludlow has been 14 years in the service, 13 years signalman, and employed for nearly two years in the Hastings junction signal-cabin, where he had come on duty at 5.15 a.m. (about 4 1/2 hours before the collision) for a spell of 8 3/4 hours.
The arrangements under which down trains from St. Leonards Warrior Square are now admitted into Hastings station are anything but conducive to safe working, as is evidenced by the fact that the present collision, and one less serious, about two months previously, under very similar circumstances, have occurred under them. The fact of shunting being allowed on the down line up to near the home-signals (which are to be seen only for a distance of 75 yards) when a down train has been accepted. from St. Leonards Warrior Square, and has been allowed to leave that station without any caution to the driver that, though the block section is clear, the station is blocked would be risky working under any circumstances; but when, in addition to this, the approach to the station is through a tunnel about half a mile long, terminating 153 yards from the home-signals, and down a gradient of 1 in 100, which extends through the tunnel, and for 50 yards outside it, the risk becomes far greater.
If the interlocking in the cabin at the west end of Hastings station were brought into harmony with modern practice, and the cross-over road through which theBrighton train had to pass were made to precede the School Board siding points, shunting up the down line into the School Board siding might be carried on with perfect safety and without-causing any delay to down trains going to platforms on the south side of the station. This improvement should be made at once, and it is greatly to be regretted it was not made long since. '
Another desirable improvement would be to move the down distant-signal from its present position in the tunnel to the Warrior Square end of the tunnel, which would make it about 950 yards from the signal-cabin, not too far to enable it to be worked with tolerable facility. This distant-signal ought also to be properly interlocked either with the home signals or with any connection fouling the down line, instead of, as at present, not being interlocked at all.
The down home-signals also should be moved to the west side of the new over bridge, so as to improve the view of them. This is a matter which ought to have been attended to before or during tho construction of the over-bridge, which now so shortens the view of these signals.