1895
EAST CROYDON
31st AUGUST 1895
Involving
Driver John Wilson
depot unknown
extracted and adapted from the report by
G.W. Addison, Lieut. Col., R.E.
Lieut Col R.E.
An accident that occurred on the 31st August, at East Croydon station, on the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway. In this case, as the 5.5 p.m. express from London Bridge to Eastbourne was approaching East Croydon station, ten of the vehicles left the rails at the V crossing of the cross-over road between the up and down main lines, just in front of Croydon
north signal-box.
Eleven passenger have complained of injuries; and two guards, in different parts of the train, were bruised about tho head and limbs, but their injuries were not serous.
The train consisted of a six-wheel tender engine and 14 vehicles, marshalled as follows, viz.: Third class bogie-carriage, three (six-wheel) composite-carriages, and a (four-wheel) brake-van, for Eastbourne; first-class slip brake-carriage, three composite carriages, and a third-class brake-carriage (all having six wheels), for Worthing; third-class slip-brake, first class bogie, second-class and third-class brake-carriages (all with four wheels, excepting the first-class bogie), for East Grinstead. The brake-van, No. 32, in rear of the Eastbourne conches, appears to have been the first vehicle to leave the rails, but it remained attached to the train in front until the driver pulled up after running, through Croydon station, about 500 yards; the leading wheels of the van were then on the rails, the trailing wheels being off on tho near side, and the right buffer was locked with tho buffer of the composite-carriage in front of it.
The Worthing and East Grinstead portions separated from the rest of the train and from each other, and came to a standstill with an interval of a few yards only between them, and with tho front of tho leading vehicle 150 yards in advance of the V crossing; these carriages were zig-zagged across the down main and loop lines and the junction between those lines.
The damage done to the rolling-stock was, under the circumstances, not great.
The permanent-way was more or less disturbed and damaged for a distance of about 150 yards.
Description.
The scene of this accident was about 180 yards north of the main down line platform at East Croydon, on a gradient rising towards the station at 1 in 264 and on a curve to the left of 107 chains radius.
East Croydon is 10 miles 22 chains from London Bridge, and the 5.5 p.m. train is allowed 15 minutes to run that distance, or an average speed of 41 miles an hour; from Norwood Junction to East Croydon, 1 mile 53 chains, three minutes are allowed, or an average speed of only 33 miles nn hour.
In the latter length, the curves of the down line arc as follows :-
Straight - 250 yards,
94 chain curve to the right - 550 yards,
Straight 275 yards, - 275 yards,
107 chain curve to the right - 360 yards,
85 chain curve to the left - 510 yards,
107 curve to the left - 125 yards
72 chin curve to the left 94 chain curve to the left - 185 yards
On leaving Norwood Junction the line falls towards East Croydon at 1 in 66O for l,276 yards, and then rises at 1 in 264 through the station and for a considerable distance south of it.
The permanent-way is of the usual type adopted by the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway, and I found it generally in very fair order; the gauge was correct, slightly tight at the crossing, and the ballast between the rails was sufficient and of satisfactory quality.
The outer or right band rail of the curve had a little super-elevation on either side of the crossing where the accident occurred, but at the crossing the outer rail was about 1/4 inch lower than the inner rail. A long, through timber, immediately in front of the V, carries the four rails of the down main line and the cross-over road; this timber, although sound under the chairs and between the rails, was decayed at the end, and the fastenings (hollow trenails and spikes) of the chair carrying the left hand main line rail had worked loose.
Such marks as were visible when I held the inquiry gave no clear indications of where or how the wheels first mounted the rails. The first broken chair was the one next in front of the through timber above referred to, carrying the two wing rails of the crossing; the main line wing-rail, I may add, was displaced and turned over on its side. The check-rail opposite to tho crossing was quite uninjured and it showed no signs of having been mounted. The first broken chair of tho left-hand rail was the sixth in front of the through timber; in all about 200 chairs were broken in a length of 150 yards, and some were broken inside and some outside both rails. The right-hand rail of the junction with the down loop was displaced for about 110 feet, this junction being about 100 feet in advance of the V crossing.
I examined the vehicles composing the train, without finding any defects which could at all account for the accident. The wheel-gauge was only out to a very trifling extent in one or two instances whore the axles had been slightly bent. The best proof perhaps of the good condition of the rolling-stock is to be found in the very small amount of damage which the carriages sustained.
The weights of the various vehicles were :-
Engine and tender 60 tons
Eastbourne portion
Third class bogie carriage 18 1/4 tons
Three composite carriages each 12 1/4 tons
Brake van, No.32 6 17/20 tons
Worthing portion
First class slip van 13 tons
Three composite carriages each 12 1/4 tons
Third class brake van 12 tons
East Grinstead portion
Third class slip van 7 17/20 tons
First class bogie carriage 18 3/4 tons
Second class carriage 8 1/2 tons
Third class brake van 7 17/20 tons
The London, Brighton, and South-Coast Railway arrangements for ''slipping" are of interest in this case, in view of the fact that when the roar brake-van of tho front portion of the train left the rails, each of the two rear portions was almost immediately slipped without any action on the part of the guards in the slip-vans.
The following are the instructions on the subject, contained in tho Appendix to the
Working Time Tables :-
Each of the slip-brakes is provided with a brake regulator-valve and is to be used for stopping the slipping portion of a train after it has been detached from the front part. Those valves are slightly different in construction from these on the engines, but are worked in the same manner.
Each vehicle fitted with the Westinghouse brake is provided with a cock or tap, outside, to be turned off before any vehicle is uncoupled. In the guard's slip-van this cock or tap can be turned off by the guard putting his hand through the small door provided for the purpose.
In forming a train with a slip portion, care must be taken to put the slip-brake next the rear brake in the front portion of the train.
On no account must a brake not fitted with a regulator and brake appliances for slipping, be used us a slip-van.
Before the train starts, the Westinghouse brake-pipe must be connected between each two carriages or vehicles in the usual way, so that the driver or either of the guards will have the means of applying the brake to every vehicle of the train when necessary the front guard of the rear portion must pass a piece of plain cord, free
from knots and kinks, under the clip and through the hole in the end of his van and
must pass this over the pulley and tie it firmly through the hole in the end of the
handle of the Westinghouse brake-tap at the back of the carriage or van in front.
After the train is properly coupled, he must pull out as much slack cord as will
prevent risk of the stretching of the couplings causing a strain.
To slip. - On nearing a place for slipping off a portion of a train the guard of the slipping portion, having seen the signals for station or junction they are approaching are all right for the train to pass, and after exchanging the proper signals, he must first pull this piece of cord and close the tap on the back of the front van or carriage. He will then instantly close the tap on the outside of his own van by putting his hand through the small door provided for that purpose; after which he must pull the detaching cord of the main coupling and tho trains will be divided."
Evidence.
Frederick Taylor states: I have been 20 years in the Company's service, 16 years as passenger guard. On the 31st ultimo I came on duty at 8 a.m. to work until about 7 p.m. On the above date I left London Bridge about 5.7 p.m., in charge of the Worthing portion of the 5.5 train. There were 14 vehicles in all, five in front of me for Eastbourne, five for Worthing, and four for East Grinstead. My portion consisted of first-class brake, three composite-carriages and a third-class brake; I was riding in the front van of the first-class coach in which the apparatus is fitted for slipping my coaches, which is done, at Haywards Heath. The East Grinstead portion is slipped at Horley. The front portion runs through from London Bridge to Lewes without stopping. On our arrival at Blue Anchor signal-box, the signals were against us and we stopped there for a few minutes; at Croydon up junction (near Bricklayer's Arms), we were nearly stopped again; from the latter point to Croydon we ran without any check. I noticed nothing whatever unusual in the running of the train until there was a sudden jerk near the Croydon north signal-box. I was sitting on the near side of the van and was thrown off but caught hold of the brake wheel. The string to the brake-tap of the vehicle in front was fixed under the clip in my van, as usual; the string to the slip-hook was round the clear placed in the van for tho purpose, both strings were fairly "taut." My van jumped up and let the rails immediately. I applied the Westinghouse brake and about that time I found the train had divided in front of me, but I had not pulled the cord of the slipping apparatus. The slip coupling was nice and tight. when we started. The train is made up on Saturdays with fewer coaches in the Eastbourne portion than on other days. I have been working this train for 14 years. I have not felt any oscillation, or jumping, at this spot previously. We ran about 150 yards beyond the crossing and then came to a stand with all my vehicles off the rails on the near side, and the East Grinstead portion had separated and was about. half a coach length behind us. I found my slip hook hanging down as usual, practically uninjured; the brake-cock on my van was open. No one in my coaches complained of any injury. I did not leave the train to examine the road, but I assisted the passengers to alight. On account of tho dust in rear of the Eastbourne train I could see nothing of the van of that portion. My first·class slip brake vehicle had only been on the train since tho previous Thursday, the regular brake having gone to Brighton for repairs. They are precisely similar in all respects. I do not book the train, so I did not look at my watch when we stopped The speed was throughout about the same as usual.
Charles Nicholas states: I have been 32 years in the company's service, 24 years as passenger guard. On the 31st ultimo my hours of duty were from 9. 45 a.m. to 9 p.m. On that date I left London Bridge about 5.7 p.m. in charge of' the East Grinstead coaches of that train. They were placed in tear of the' train in the following order, third class slip-brake, first-class bogie, second-class, third-class brake. I rode in the slip-brake, i.e., the front, vehicle of the East Grinstead portion. When we started the slip couplings were properly connected up, and the string was made fast in my van so as not to allow too much play, it was fairly tight, The cord to the brake-plug of the vehicle in front was fixed, as unusual about the running of the train, no oscillation or jumping until we arrived outside Croydon station. I was sitting on the near side when my van began to jump about I got up and steadied myself by holding the wheel, so us to apply the Westinghouse brake but I am not quite certain whether I put the levee over or not. I think I had done so. Finally my van swerved round and I fell down; when I got up and looked out I saw that we had separated from the carriages in front; the slip cord still remained fixed round the' bracket, and the stop-cock cord had been pulled through. My slip-couplings did not appear to have been damaged. I found the Worthing carriages only a few yards ahead of us. The whole or my carriages were off the rails on the near side. The Westinghouse brake was connected through the train from front to rear. No passengers in my carriages complained of any injuries. From tho moment that my van began to jump about there was so much dust that. I could see nothing ahead, and I did not realize whether we were off the rails or not until we came to a stand. My coaches were connected in the same order· as usual and I had the same brake-van in use.
Frederick William Mountford states I have been 20 years in the Company's service, nearly all the time as passenger guard. On the 31st ultimo I came on duty at 1.20 p.m. to work until 1 a.m. on the following day. On that date I left London Bridge at 5.7 p.m. (one minute late) in immediate charge of the Eastbourne carriages on that train. They were coupled up as follows,
viz., third·class bogie, three composite saloon bake, and I rode in the latter. We were pulled up at Up Croydon junction for three minutes and checked again at Bricklayer's Arms junction, and we had also been checked at blue Anchor box. We should be about six minutes late on getting away from Bricklayers' Arms; the train was stopped at East Croydon at 5.27, about six minutes behind time. I noticed nothing unusual in any way until just opposite to Croydon North box, when my van suddenly dropped at the trailing end; I was sitting on the near side looking out for signals at the time. I was thrown on to the floor and the luggage came down on to me; l then realised that the train had parted. I was unable to get to my brake handle, as I was thrown about in the van until the train stopped under the new buildings at the southern end of the station. When 1 got out of the van the leading wheels were on the rails and the trailing wheels were off on the near side. The right buffer was locked with the buffer of the coach in front. The speed approaching Croydon was as nearly as possible the same as usual. I have never noticed anything wrong passing the spot before. The Eastbourne vehicles on Saturdays are different from those in use on other days.
John Wilson states; I have been 25 years in the Company's service and employed as a driver the whole of the time. I had been previously for 13 years with other companies. On the 31st ultimo I came on duty at 3.20 p.m. to book off about 11 p.m. On that date I left London Bridge at 5.7 p.m. to run to Eastbourne. My engine, No. 217, is a six-wheeled engine (four coupled wheels), fitted with Westinghouse and hand brakes. I noticed nothing whatever unusual with the running of the train on that occasion until approaching the platform at Croydon station, when I saw a sudden strain on the engine, caused, in my opinion, by the vehicles leaving the rails. My mate looked. back and saw the ballast flying about. I applied the Westinghouse brake at once; we were then about two engine lengths along the platform. The train stopped with the engine two or three lengths beyond the bridge. I noticed nothing at all as we passed through the crossing, opposite to the north signal box. I should estimate the speed passing the box at about 45 miles an hour.
Thomas Hillman, states: I have been 18 years in the Company's service, the whole time as plate layer on the main line from East Croydon station up to the viaduct. On the 31st ultimo I was employed in the morning clearing up the station yard. At 1 p.m. I started from the north box to walk along the down road and back on the up road; I had a few keys to knock in here and there, otherwise everything was all right. I looked at the crossing opposite to the box:
and found it in good order.
Richard Gardner, states : I have been 17 years in the Company's service, and for the last 12 months ganger of the length from 9 1/4 miles to 10 1/2 miles. At 6 a.m. I commence opposite the north signal-box and walk on the down line through the station back to the box and then on towards London and back gain. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon I go through the whole again. I went carefully through my length on Saturday morning the 31st ultimo and Thomas Hillman took my place in the afternoon. When inspecting the line 1 found a few loose "keys,'' but I consider it was there practically in perfect order. 'l'he crossing was put in new five years ago, at which time the whole of the sleepers were new; on the 13th of last month I opened the timbers out and beat them up, nothing has been done since then und probably nothing was required previously for about two months. I consider the sleepers are now in good condition, but there is one which I might have taken out in the course of a week or so. This is tho crossing timber, which is unsound at one end but perfectly good under the chair. I had tried the gauge the day before the accident and it was then correct. After the accident some chairs were broken under both rails, some on the outside and some on the inside. The formation level of the road where the accident happened is on gravel and is an exceptionally firm bed. The crossing has given me less trouble than many others.
Conclusion.
The derailment of a passenger train at the V crossing of an ordinary cross-over road having trailing connections with the main lines is a very rare occurrence. When, as in this case, little or no explanation of it is to be found in the evidence given at the Board of Trade enquiry, the cause must necessarily remain to a great extent a matter of conjecture.
The driver and three guards, all men of considerable experience, state positively that the speed of the train was no faster than usual, and that until the accident happened there had been no unusual oscillation or movement visible. The train was delayed between London Bridge and Bricklayer's Arms junction, and was about six minutes late when it got away from the junction. Time does not, however, appear to have been saved between Bricklayer's Arms and East Croydon, for guard Mountford says that when the train stopped it was still about six minutes behind time. The booked times of the train from London Bridge to Croydon represent an average speed of 41·8 miles an hour, but only a speed of 33·2 miles an hour for the last 1 mile 53 chains from Norwood junction to East Croydon. The driver estimates the actual speed when approaching East Croydon station at 45 miles an hour, although judging from the case with which the front part of the train was pulled up, and from the distance run by the derailed vehicles, I am inclined to think that for once the estimate is too high.
So far as the curves and gradients of the line are concerned there is nothing to make fast running between Norwood junction and East Croydon undesirable if necessary.
At the crossing where the accident occurred the line is on a curve to the left of 107 chains radius. As stated above, the outer rail of the curve has a super-elevation before the crossing is reached, but on the through timber immediately in front of the crossing the inner rail was slightly the higher of the two. According to the ordinary formula for calculating super-elevation, the outer rail of a curve of 107 chains should be about one inch higher than the inner for a speed of 45 miles an hour; at a speed of 30 miles an hour, practically speaking, no super-elevation is required on a curve of that radius. If there is no super-elevation where it is theoretically needed, the result is to throw undue strain upon the outer rail, in this case the right-hand rail, and there would also be a tendency to lift tho left-hand wheels off their rail.
It will be noticed that the wing rail of the crossing, on the right side of the train as it was running, was displaced; the difficult point to decide is whether this caused the accident, or if it was done by the derailment of the train, Guard Mountford, who was riding in brake-van No. 32, the leading vehicle of those which left the rails, and who gave his evidence very clearly and well, states that the first intimation he got of anything having occurred was by the trailing end of the van suddenly dropping, which looks an though the road had spread before this vehicle reached the crossing.
The more probable explanation, however, is that the light van, between two heavy vehicles, jumped. off the rails at this point, partly at any rate owing to oscillation set up by the state of the permanent-way. It goes without saying that, where express trains are constantly running, every detail of the permanent-way requires to be maintained in the highest state of efficiency, and it is of the utmost importance that the sleepers or timbers under the rails should be packed, or beaten up, so as to adjust the weight of the train properly. The loose chair fastenings and the low inner rail of the curve, described above, show that sufficient attention had not been paid to details. The defects in the permanent-way were, so far as they existed at the time of my enquire, not serious, still the fact cannot be got away from that an accident occurred at the very spot where they were found, and no other cause is apparent which is not
much more improbable than either of those mentioned.
I may add that the Eastbourne portion of the train is made up differently on Saturdays from other days of the week, and that brake-van No. 32 was regularly working between London and Brighton except on Saturdays. The next vehicle in rear of it, first-class slip-brake No. 517, had only been on the train for a few days, but it had been previously used three or four times a week for special purposes. As stated above, there appeared to be nothing in the condition of those, or any of the other, vehicles to account in the very slightest degree for the accident.
Some misapprehension existed after the occurrence as to the slipping of the two rear portions of the train, it being thought that the guards had slipped them un finding their vehicles off the line. This was not so. The detaching- cord of the main coupling is made fast in the slip-brake compartment, and when the van in. front of the Worthing brake left the rails it no doubt stretched the couplings enough to strain the cord and thus release them; similarly, when the rear vehicle of the Worthing portion left the rails the couplings between it and the East Grinstead slip-brake were released. It would, I think, be better to allow a little more "'slack" in the cord in. future, for it is not generally desirable (as pointed out in the rules given above), that the stretching of the couplings should strain the cord.
As soon as the Worthing and East Grinstead carriages were slipped, the Westinghouse brakes were automatically applied, the guard not having closed the tap outside his van as he does before he slips in the ordinary way. If any further proof of the immense value of automatic brakes be necessary in the present day, the results of this accident should, I think, satisfy everyone. Two portions of the. train, consisting respectively of five and four vehicles, ran separated, and close behind one another, for 150 yards off the rails, and came to a standstill with comparatively little injury to passengers or rolling stock.