The collision that occurred at London Bridge on the 24th December 1891, on which date the 7.50 a.m. train from Wimbledon ran into two empty third-class carriages, which were standing against the buffer-stops at the end of No. 3 platform line.
Three passengers are reported to have been slightly shaken.
The train consisted of a tank-engine weighing 41 tons, with four wheels coupled, and 12 carriages, of which two had brake-compartments. It was fitted throughout with the Westinghouse automatic brake, and there were also hand-brakes on the engine and on the two carriages with brake-compartments. .
No damage was done to the engine, permanent-way, or buffer-stops; but the two front carriages of the train and one of the empty vehicles standing in the bay were knocked about. .
Description.
The place where this collision occurred was at the end of No. 3 platform on the South London line of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway. The platform, is 212 yards long.
At the entrance to the platform there are two signals, known as the in-platform signals, referring to this line.
The upper arm has to be lowered in order to give permission for a train to enter the platform; but the lower arm is merely intended to warn drivers whether the line is clear up to the end of the platform or not. If the line is clear up to the buffer-stops this lower signal-arm is pulled off, but if the line is occupied, either by another train or by empty carriage:-, this arm is kept at danger, and in this way an intimation is conveyed to drivers as to whether they may expect a clear road up to the end of the platform or not.
On the occasion in question this arm was at danger, and the driver therefore knew· that the platform line was not clear to the end.
The following distances should be noted:-
From the buffer stops to the girder signals 362 yards
From the buffer stops to the south cabin 384 yards
From the buffer stops to the home signals 554 yards
From the buffer stops to the distant signal 1,114 yards
The following is the rule in the Company's appendix to their working time-book as to the manner in which trains are to be pulled up in terminal stations:-
In approaching terminal stations or stations at which other trains may be standing on the same line of rails, the Westinghouse automatic brake must not be used except in cases of emergency, but the speed of the train must be so reduced that it may be brought to a stand, with certainty and at the proper place, by means of the handbrakes and steam-brakes alone.
Guards must not be seated away from their hand-brakes, but must always be standing in such a position as to be able, together with the enginemen, to promptly apply their hand-brakes when trains are entering stations at which the trains call, as well as terminal stations.
Evidence.
Alfred Molyneux, guard, states: I have been in the Company's service eight years nine months, and four years' guard. On 24th December I came on duty at 5.55 a.m. at New Cross to work the 6.5 a. m. empty train New Cross to Peckham Rye. I then came to London Bridge and joined the 7.11 a. m. London Bridge to Wimbledon train. I started back from Wimbledon by the train due to leave at 7.50 a.m., but it did not leave till 8.21 a.m. My train consisted of 12 vehicles, two of them having brake compartments, one at the head and the other at the tail of the train. I was head guard, and was riding in the front van. There was one carriage (second-class) between the engine and front van, and one third-class behind the rear van. The ordinary train consists of 10 vehicles, but it is strengthened in the morning by the addition of two extra coaches. The train was fitted throughout with the Westinghouse automatic brake. The brake was tested before leaving London Bridge, and it was then all right; but, on reaching Tulse Hill on the return journey, the driver told me that the donkey-engine would not work, and that the brake was of no use in consequence. The next stop after this would be North Dulwich, and the train was there pulled up by means of the hand-brakes. I applied my handbrake, and there was no overrun. There would he three more stops before reaching: London Bridge, and the train was pulled up at all these places by the hand-brakes. At Queen's Road, the last station before London Bridge, after shutting a carriage door, I slipped on the platform and fell down. I got up and jumped on to the foot board of a carriage, and walked along the footboard to try and reach my van, but I could not do so as the foot-boards were slippery, and the handles too far apart to catch bold of. I therefore got into the carriage. On approaching London Bridge I opened the window, and looked out for the signals. I could not see the distant-signal worked from the south-box as it was very foggy. I saw the stop-signal outside the south box, and that was off. I did not see the girder-signals, nor did I see the in-platform signals. When we passed the distant-signal of the south-box, we would be travelling about seven or eight miles an hour, which is slower than usual. I do not know whether the driver had steam on then, nor do I know where he applied his hand-brake. But the speed was slackened, and we almost stopped at the outer home-signals (i.e. south box home-signals). We drew forward slowly at about four miles an hour, but the speed was decreased, and we entered the station about three miles an hour. We had got about half way along the platform when the driver gave the engine more steam. I jumped out on to the plat-form, in order to try and regain my brake ; but the platform was crowded with passengers and they got into my way, and I only succeeded in getting into my brake compartment as the collision occurred. I had no idea there was likely to be a collision. I think we struck the stops at about three miles an hour. The fog was very thick in the station, and I did not know how far up the platform the train was at the time I got out. The rule is that on entering terminal stations, the train should be stopped by means of the hand-brakes, and I always apply my hand-brake when coming to terminal stations. I did not hear the driver whistle for the brakes at any time. I cannot say whether the brakes were on the wheels of the rear van or tender after the collision. One passenger complained to me of injury. After the passengers were all out, I went to the superintendent's office to make a report. After leaving Tulse Hill, my gauge showed no pressure in the train. I rode in the front brake compartment.
Waiter Foot, porter, states: I have been in the Company's service about seven years as porter, and I have acted as guard on and off for five years. On the 24th December I came on duty at 5.20a.m. at London Bridge. I joined the train that is due to leave London Bridge at 7.10 a.m., as under guards. The train was fitted with the Westinghouse brake, and it was tested before leaving London Bridge, and it was then all right. It worked all right up to the time we reached Tulse Hill on the return journey. At Tulse Hill my mate informed me that the Westinghouse donkey had failed, and that we should have to use the hand brakes for stopping. At the next station I need my hand-brake. I did not know that my mate had missed his van at Queen's Road. On approaching London Bridge I saw the distant-signal worked from the south box, and it was then on. I saw the stop-signals for the south box, and they were off. The train slackened speed at the south cabin. It was then going about 10 miles an hour, and after slackening speed it came forward at about five miles an hour. When we reached the in-platform signals, we were travelling at less than four miles an hour. I had applied my brake on the south side of south cabin (the driver having, I think, whistled for it). I saw the in-platform signals as my van passed them; they were then on. I had my brake hard on at that time, and I did not think we were travelling too fast. I heard the driver give the engine more steam when he would be about half-way along the platform. When the collision occurred my van was outside the roof, about two-thirds down the platform. we were going' at about three miles an hour at the time of the collision, and I think if there had been nothing in the way the driver would have pulled up before be reached the buffer-stops. I have worked these trains several times, and I think we came into the station slower than usual. The rule is that guards stand by their band-brakes on entering a terminal station, and I always do so, and apply my brake. I did so on this occasion.
William Armes, driver, states: I have been in the Company's service 11 years, and registered driver rather more than six months. On the 24th December I came on duty at 5.15 a.m. to work the 6 a.m. empty train from New Cross to Peckham Rye. I then came on to London Bridge, and there joined the 7.10 a.m. train to Wimbledon and back. My engine was No. 263, four-wheel-coupled passenger tank-engine, fitted with Westinghouse brake working blocks on all the wheels, and there was also a hand-brake working the same blocks. We were running bunker first. I tested the Westinghouse brake before leaving London Bridge, and it was in good order. The donkey was then working well. At Streatham I thought there was something wrong with the donkey, a.'l the gland was blowing, and I found I could not keep up the pressure. I used the bake for stopping at Streatham. I had then about 50 lbs. I used it again at Tulse Hill, and I then had only about 20 lbs., and after this stop I could not get the pressure up to release the brakes, and they were released by hand; the fireman and guard did this. I told the guard we should have to use hand brakes for the rest of the journey. We stopped at all the stations afterwards with the hand brakes and had no overruns. The guards had their brakes on to help rue. I did not know the head guard had missed his van at Queen's Road. He gave us the signal to start, at least, I heard him call out and blow his whistle. It was very foggy. The rails were rather greasy. On approaching London Bridge I did not see the south box distant, but we ran over two fog signals there, and I shut off steam and applied the hand brake. We were going about 10 or 15 miles an hour, slower than usual because of the fog and the absence of the automatic brake. We came forward to the south box stop signals, and when we were approaching these signals the Forman called out, "Right away, main," otherwise I should have stopped at the signals. When I passed the signals they were off. When I reached the girder signals they were also off. We were then going about four or five miles an hour. When I reached the in-platform signals I saw them, and the top arm was off, but the lower arm was at danger. This I knew to mean that there was something in the road. We were then going about two or three miles an hour. My mate released his brake just after passing the platform signals, because we were going so slowly. I gave the engine a little steam to pull the train into the platform. I could not terminal stations is that we should use the hand brakes only, except in cases of emergency. If I had had the Westinghouse brake I should still have entered the station with the hand-brake, but I should have been able to have stopped the train before we struck the see the coaches tilI was a length and a half from them. I had not steam on then, but the brake was hard on. Up to the time I saw the coaches, I did not think we were so far down the platform. As soon as I saw the coaches I reversed the engine and gave her steam, and the wheels then skidded. The rule for entering empty coaches. I am sure that if the head guard had been in his van, the collision would not have occurred. When I gave the engine steam in the station, I only gave her two or three beats. I knew theWestinghouse brake was not available. I had not for gotten that. I did not notice the carriages on the road alongside. When the fog-signals went off at the distant, I whistled for the guard's brake, and we nearly came to a stand outside the south cabin home-signals.
Conclusion.
This collision was caused by an error of judgment on the part of the driver Armes, who, after entering the station gave the engine more steam in order, as he thought, to draw the train sufficiently far along the platform. There was a thick fog at the time, and the driver evidently miscalculated his position when he did this, and he was also in ignorance of the fact that the head guard was not in his van, and that therefore the hand-brake in that van was not available.
The rule in force on the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway as to the non- use of the continuous-brake on entering terminal stations is sufficiently explicit, and there is nothing in the evidence to lead me to suppose that the rule was being infringed on this occasion.
The Westinghouse brake had broken down during the journey, but this brake, under any circumstances, would not have been relied upon for stopping the train in a terminal station, and the driver was rightly depending on the hand-brakes on the engine and two vans.
Unfortunately, the head guard had fallen down owing to the slipperiness of the platform at Queen's Road, and had failed to get into his van, and the driver had therefore less brake power on his train than he thought. The driver was aware that the bay line was occupied by some empty vehicles, for the caution-signal which is intended to convey this intimation at the entrance to the platform, was seen and understood by him. But thinking that his train would come to a stand too soon, and being deceived as to his position by the fog, he gave the engine two or there beats of steam, which renewed the impetus of the train and caused the disaster.
The head guard Molyneux might perhaps have shown a little more activity in trying to regain his van while the train was travelling slowly, either before or after reaching the station ; but it is not easy to say, whether under the circumstances, he could have sunceeded or not.
The failure of the Westinghouse brake was due to the use of a soft metal washer in one of the air-pump connexions. In screwing up the connexion, this washer got squeezed out of place and fractured, and rendered the joint no longer air tight, with the result that the air instead of being pumped into the rP-servoir blew out into the open.
The air-pump had only come out of the workshops a fortnight before, after being thoroughly overhauled.
Had the Westinghouse brake been available, the driver, though intending in the first instance to pull up the train with the hand-brakes, would have doubtless applied the continuous-brake as soon as he saw the empty coaches in front of him, and the effects of the collision would have been mitigated. As it was, all he could do was to reverse his engine.
On consideration of all the facts of the case, I do not think any serious blame is to be attached to the driver of the train for this slight collision. He seems to have entered the station cautiously, and had the front guard been in his van and in a position to apply his brake, the collision would probably not have occurred. He had been on duty about four hours at the time.